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I.

INTRODUCTION

Today's litigators-and their clients-will tell you that litigation in cases
involving voluminous documents is a harrowing and enormously expensive
business. The problems were serious enough when most documents were on paper.
The difficulty of the situation is exacerbated in what has become the ordinary case
where many, if not most, of the documents either exist or are preserved
electronically.'

Among the most difficult problems is guarding against disclosure of documents
that may be protected by the attomey-client privilege or subject to work product

protection.' Many courts will hold that even an inadvertent or unintentional
disclosure of a document in discovery will result in the forfeiture or waiver3 of the
privilege or protection.4 Many courts, irrespective of their treatment of inadvertent

disclosure, hold that when waiver is found to exist it covers not only the document
itself but also any communication dealing with the same subject matter.5
Thus, counsel must carefully review all documents to assess the possible
application of privilege or work product protection. In the not-so-infrequent case

involving millions of documents, such a review will cost the client hundreds of
thousands of dollars.6 An innocent slip-up by a paralegal charged with reviewing

1. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004); Melanie B. Leslie, The
Costs ofConfidentialityandthe PurposeofPrivilege,2000 Wis. L. REV. 31, 56-57; Richard L. Marcus,
The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator,84 MICH. L. REV. 1605, 1610-11 (1986); Paul R.
Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege:The ErodingConcept ofConfidentialityShouldBeAbolished, 47 DUKE
L.J. 853, 864 (1998).
2. Documents protected by other evidentiary privileges, including the psychotherapist-patient and
various governmental privileges, may also be at risk. However, especially in private corporate litigation
and in controversies between corporations and government agencies, counsel's most pervasive worries
concern the attorney-client privilege and work product protection. For that reason, as well as a concern
that too broad of a rule would run the risk of being both over- and under-inclusive, the Rule proposed
in this Article deals only with attorney-client privilege and work product protection. In addition, see
infra note 262, addressing the possible constitutional implications of a rule that attempted to include
a broad set of evidentiary privileges.
3. The term "waiver" is used throughout this article and in the Proposed Rule to describe a loss
of a privilege or protection as a result of disclosure of protected material, regardless of whether that
disclosure was intended. An unintentional disclosure of privileged matter should more correctly be
considered a "forfeiture" of the privilege rather than a waiver, which implies an intentional
relinquishment of the protection. Nevertheless, courts have consistently used the term waiver rather than
forfeiture in connection with unintentional disclosures. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 9 (Revised
2004), availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/CVAug04.pdf [hereinafter REVISED
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT ON FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] (quoting MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 1, at § 11.446) (using the term waiver in connection with inadvertent
disclosure of privileged material); infra notes 63-76 and accompanying text.

4. See infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
6. For a case from almost thirty years ago involving 17 million pages of documents, see
Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM, 573 F.2d 646,648 (9th Cir. 1978). The problems experienced in
Transamericahave grown even more common and complex with the proliferation of electronically
created and maintained documents. See also Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205
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documents may have catastrophic implications for the case in which the discovery
took place and in other litigation involving the same documents or issues.
Furthermore, the law governing waiver may cause counsel to include
documents in her privilege log that are of no concern to the client. For example,
assume an imagined, but not unlikely, circumstance in which a cover letter
transmitting a contract to a party's attorney is inadvertently disclosed during
discovery. The cover letter itself may say nothing about the substance of the
contract or in any way disclose confidential information about any matter.
However, the letter is a communication in the course of seeking legal advice and
is therefore likely to be covered by the attorney-client privilege. If covered by the
privilege, a disclosure of the letter to opposing counsel during discovery would
constitute a waiver of the privilege with regard to that document. But more
significant than the waiver with regard to the disclosed document is the possibility,
indeed the likelihood in many courts, that the waiver will extend to all
communications on the same subject matter-in this instance, the attached
contract.7
Counsel for both sides in cases involving a large number of documents
frequently enter into "claw back" or "quick peek" agreements that permit disclosure
of privileged documents without waiver of privilege. These agreements are often
embodied in a court order. The Manualfor Complex Litigation acknowledges the
existence of such agreements:
A responding party's screening of vast quantities of unorganized
computer data for privilege prior to production can be particularly
onerous in those jurisdictions in which inadvertent production of
privileged data may constitute a waiver of privilege as to a
particular item of information, items related to the relevant issue,
or the entire data collection. Fear of the consequences of
inadvertent waiver may add cost and delay to the discovery
process for all parties. Thus, judges often encourage counsel to
F.R.D. 421, 425-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that in a case involving the production of e-mails, the
estimated cost of pre-production review for privileged and work product material would cost one
defendant $247,000 and another $120,000, and such review would take months); Dennis R. Kiker,
Waiving the Privilegein a Storm ofData:An Argumentfor Unifonnity andRationalityin Dealingwith
the Inadvertent ProductionofPrivilegedMaterialsin the Age ofElectronicallyStored Information, 12
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 15, 4 (2006), http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v12i4/articlel 5.pdf("[C]omputer users
sent approximately 31 billion e-mail messages every day in 2002, 'a figure which [was] expected to
double by 2006."') (quoting PETER LYMAN & HAL R. VARIAN, How MucH INFORMATION? 2003 pt.
IV.C (2003), http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info-2003/printable-exec
sum.pdf)).
7. Such a draconian result would be consistent with language in many cases to the effect that a
disclosure of a privileged document "will be deemed to encompass 'all other such communications on
the same subject."' E.g., Texaco P.R., Inc. v. Dep't. of Consumer Affairs, 60 F.3d 867, 883-84 (1stCir.
1995) (quoting Weil v. Inv/Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d. 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981)); In
re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980-81 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (reaffirming that "a waiver of the privilege in
an attorney-client communication extends 'to all other communications relating to the same subject
matter."' (quoting In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982))); see infra Part III.
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stipulate at the outset of discovery to a "nonwaiver" agreement,

which they can adopt as a case-management order. Such
agreements protect responding parties from the most dire
consequences of inadvertent waiver by allowing them to "take
back" inadvertently produced privileged materials if discovered
within a reasonable period, perhaps thirty days from production. 8
The recently amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically recognize
the existence of such agreements by providing that if the parties can agree to an
arrangement that protects against waiver and allows production without a complete
privilege review, the court may enter a case-management order adopting that
agreement. 9
However useful claw back or quick-peek agreements are between the parties
to the case, the agreements cannot give counsel and their clients total comfort. At
least in the absence of legislation, such agreements cannot bind persons or entities
not party to them. I0 Under present law, even a court order declaring the continuing
viability of the privilege may not be effective against someone not a party to the

litigation." Thus, with a non-party's possible claim of waiver hovering in the
future, the necessity of a thorough and costly review of all documents produced still
exists.

Litigation involving millions of documents is not the only situation in which
waiver of privilege presents a problem. Another equally difficult but different issue

concerns waiver of the privilege in connection with investigations by government
agencies. In the course of an investigation, a government agency, such as the

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), may seek the cooperation of the target
of its investigation through a request to turn over documents relating to the matter

8. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 1, at § 11.446.
9. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(6) advisory committee's note (discussing the 2006 amendment); Id.
26(0(4) advisory committee's note (same).
10. The principle is a long recognized one, perhaps seldom litigated because of its obviousness.
Directly on point is HartfordFireInsurance Co. v. Guide Corp., 206 F.R.D. 249 (S.D. Ind. 2001), in
which the court held an agreement regarding the waiver of privileges could not bind third parties. Id.
at 250. The basic principle was stated by Judge Learned Hand: "[N]o court can make a decree which
will bind any one but a party." Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 832 (2d Cir. 1930); see also
United States v. Kirschenbaum, 156 F.3d 784, 794-95 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding the district court had
no power to issue a restraining order seizing assets that would be binding on defendant's wife, a nonparty); Mitchell v. Exide Techs., No. 04-2303-GTV-DJW, 2004 WL 2823230, at * I (D. Kan. 2004)
(discussing how a protective order preserving confidentiality of business information disclosed in
discovery was not binding on non-parties).
An analogous situation is the ineffectiveness of confidentiality agreements between federal
agencies and the targets of their investigations with regard to non-parties to the agreements. See In re
Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc. Sec. Litig., 450 F.3d 1179, 1194 (10th Cir. 2006), cert denied sub nom.,
Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc. v. New England Health Care Employees Pension Fund, No. 06-343, 2006
U.S. LEXIS 8627 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2006); In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig.,
293 F.3d 289, 303-04 (6th Cir. 2002); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951
F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991). For a more detailed analysis of situations where courts have rejected the
doctrine of selected waiver when parties had a confidentiality agreement, see infra Part IV.C.
11. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 1612.
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in question. 12The agency may ask that the target waive any privilege that may exist
with regard to the documents produced.' 3 The production of documents is often
accompanied by an agreement that the documents produced will not be disclosed
4
to private parties unless there is a public prosecution with regard to the matter.'
A crucial issue, especially for the target of the investigation, is whether, when
documents are produced under these circumstances, the target has waived the
privilege only in regard to the government agency or whether the target has waived
the privilege in regard to the entire world. Almost every federal court that has
considered the question has held that a party gives a general waiver of the privilege
under these circumstances, even if there is an agreement between the agency and
the target to maintain confidentiality of the material produced. 5 Courts refer to this
issue by saying that they do not recognize "selective waiver" of privilege. 6
Reasonable persons may differ as to the best policy on all of these issues. The
failure to excuse inadvertent waiver may be beneficial in that the consequences of
waiver require counsel to be careful in responding to discovery requests. 7 Finding
a broad scope of waiver not only further encourages care in disclosure, but also
prevents a party from disclosing some communications with regard to a matter
while hiding behind privilege with regard to other related communications."i A
refusal to recognize selective waiver arguably protects the interests of the public at
large and takes the use of materials disclosed by the target of an investigation out
of the sole discretionary use of a governmental agency. 9 Many lawyers, including
some representing corporations that have been the target of a governmental agency
investigation, have also argued the recognition of selective waiver would encourage
and exacerbate an existing trend by regulators and prosecutors to demand that

12. ABA Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege, Report of the American BarAssociation's
Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege,60 Bus. LAW. 1029, 1046-48 (2005).

13. See id.
at 1047.
14. See Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1226-27.
15. See discussion infra Parts IV.B-C.
16. See, e.g., Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1425 (refusing to adopt selective waiver as a third
exception to the waiver doctrine).
17. See, e.g., Int'l Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445,450 (D. Mass. 1988)
("[A] strict rule that 'inadvertent' disclosure results in a waiver of the privilege would probably do more
than anything else to instill in attorneys the need for effective precautions against such disclosure.").
For more detailed analysis of the InternationalDigitalSystems Corp. court's decision, see infra notes
47-50 and accompanying text.
18. See, for example, United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Procedings), 219 F.3d 175, 186-87
(2d Cir. 2000), rev'd, 350 F.3d 299 (2d Cir. 2003), for a discussion of how a party might attempt to
disclose only some aspects of related communications. See also infra Part III.
19. Similar views were expressed by witnesses in a hearing held by the Federal Rules of Evidence
Advisory Committee on April 24, 2006. ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES, HEARING ON

PROPOSAL 502, at 15, 16 (Committee minutes Apr. 24, 2006) [hereinafter HEARING ON PROPOSAL 502],
availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EVHearingApril _2006.pdf(last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
Also see the submission of Gregory P. Joseph in connection with that hearing. Memorandum from
Gregory P. Joseph on Privilege Waiver Rule to the Fed. Rules of Evidence Advisory Comm. 7-8
(2006), availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Joseph.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss2/2

6

Broun and Capra: Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in the Federal Courts: A P
A PROPOSAL FOR A FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502

2006]

persons being investigated waive their attorney-client privileges and work product

protection. 20
Yet, there are strong policy reasons for privilege waiver rules that would clarify
and, at least to some degree, change the law of waiver of privilege. A rule that any

disclosure of a document necessarily waives attorney-client privilege or work
product protection as to all communications dealing with the same subject matter
confronts counsel with a difficult choice-either spend enormous resources on
protecting the privileges or risk losing their protection. Where the law on
inadvertent waiver or scope of waiver is unclear, the lack of a consistent response

by the courts makes counsel's choice of a less than full review unnecessarily risky.
The refusal to recognize selective waiver in all but one federal circuit21 means
clients must risk private parties' use of the materials produced, or the government
agency will be denied the benefit of full cooperation from a target of its

investigation.
The court decisions-even within the federal system-have not given a
uniform answer to the issues of inadvertent waiver, scope of waiver, and selective
waiver.22 If there is going to be a consistent solution, it is going to have to come by
rule or statute. However, if there is to be a rule dealing with the issue, it will almost
certainly have to be enacted by Congress rather than going through the Rules
Enabling Act23 process.

20. See Memorandum from David M. Brodsky, Steven K. Hazen, R. William Ide & Mark 0.
Kasanin on Preserving the Attorney-Client Privilege to the Fed. Rules of Evidence Advisory Comm.
3 (Apr. 19, 2006) [hereinafter Preserving the Attorney-Client Privilege], available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Brodsky.pdf. (last visited Nov. 10, 2006). With regard to the general
concern about the erosion of the attorney-client privilege and work product protection, see ABA Task
Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 12, at 1047-50; JOINT DRAFTING COMM., AMERICAN
COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, THE EROSION OF THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK
PRODUCT DOCTRINE IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 9-13 (2002), available at
http://actl.com/content/navigationmenu/publications/allpublications/default.httn (follow "2002:THE
EROSION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE INFEDERAL CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 10, 2006). Compare this view with that expressed by the
amici curiae in In re Qwest Communications International Inc. Securities Litigation, 450 F.3d 1179,
1199-1200 (10th Cir. 2006), cert denied sub nam., Qwest Communications International Inc. v. New
England Health Care Employees Pension Fund, No. 06-343, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 8627 (U.S. Nov. 13,
2006), discussed infra in note 193 and accompanying text, analyzing the argument that the court should
adopt the selective waiver doctrine because the "culture" surrounding disclosures to government
agencies is not voluntary.
21. See discussion infra Part IV.A-B.
22. See discussion infra in Parts II, III, and IV. Because the Rule discussed in this Article is
proposed as a Federal Rule of Evidence, the cases cited throughout are from the federal courts.
However, state decisions reflect similar differences in treatment with regard to issues involving
inadvertent waiver and scope of waiver. See EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE:
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES, § 6.12.4-5, (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2002 & Supp. 2006); McCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE § 93 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
23. Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 401, 102 Stat. 4648, 4648-49 (1988) (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000)). Under the Rules Enabling Act, "[tihe Supreme Court shall
have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence" for the
federal district courts. Id. § 2072(a).
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During the debates in Congress on the adoption of what were then the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, many opponents of the privilege rules expressed
concern that the issues inherent in the recognition or nonrecognition of privileges
were ill-suited to the Court-initiated rulemaking process.24 Ultimately, after

enacting the Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress returned the primary evidence
rulemaking function to the judiciary with regard to future additions, deletions and
amendments, 25 except as to rules governing privilege.26 Section 2074(b) provides
that "[a]ny such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege"
must be "approved by [an] Act of Congress. 27 Although one could argue that a rule
governing waiver of privilege is not within the scope of § 2074(b), such an
argument would be tenuous indeed. It is unlikely that the Judicial Conference of the

United States, which is responsible for initiating the process under the Rules
Enabling Act,2 8 would interpret the limitation of § 2074 that narrowly. Therefore,
if there is a change in the law of waiver of privilege in the federal courts, it is likely
to come by way of congressional enactment rather than a rule adopted under the
Rules Enabling Act. However, as in the case of Federal Rules of Evidence
413-415,29 the congressional enactment could be in the form of an addition to the
federal rules-most likely the Rules of Evidence.3"
Moreover, a congressionally adopted rule on waiver of privilege or work
product protection would be of limited value to litigants if its effect were limited
to federal proceedings. A decision by counsel made with regard to the limits of
review of documents during discovery or as to the extent of disclosure in the course
of a government agency investigation would not likely be affected by a rule that
simply guarded against disclosure in later federal court litigation. An action in
which waiver of privilege was asserted could well take place in a later state court

24. See, e.g., ProposedRules of Evidence: HearingsBefore the Spec. Subcomm. on Reform of
Fed. Criminal Laws of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 119 (1973) [hereinafter House
Hearings](statement of the Committee on Federal Courts, Association of the Bar of the City of New
York) ("[C]ertain rules of evidence are of such a nature that their sole source should not be rules
promulgated by the courts."); id.at 160 (testimony of Charles R. Halpern and George T. Frampton, Jr.
on behalf of the Washington Council of Lawyers) (criticizing the Proposed Rules of Evidence because
they allow federal courts to abrogate state privileges); id.at 203-04 (testimony of George S. Leisure
on behalf of the New York Trial Lawyers Committee) (raising constitutional concerns regarding the
Proposed Rules of Evidence treatment of state privileges); id. at 263 (statement of Henry J. Friendly,
C.J., United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) (decrying the implementation of Federal
Rules of Evidence because of the possibility of reviving pre-Erie forum shopping and using privileges
as an example).
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a)(1) (2000).
26. Id.§ 2074(b) (2000).
27. Id.
28. Id.§ 2073.
29. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, § 320935(a), 108
Stat. 1796, 2135-37 (codified at FED. R. EVID. 413-415).
30. Because of the implication for both civil and criminal cases, the Federal Rules of Evidence
are a more appropriate placement than either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
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proceeding. Unless a waiver rule is binding on state courts as well, it would have
little effect on the conduct of parties in federal litigation.3'
Thus, any federal legislation dealing with waiver of privilege would have to be
applicable in both state and federal courts in order to be fully effective in dealing
with the policy concerns in voluminous document and agency investigation cases.
A problem that must be addressed is, of course, the congressional power to enact
such legislation binding on the state courts.32
This Article describes a Rule proposed by the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on Evidence Rules3 3 dealing with waiver of the attorney-client privilege
and work product protection, and argues in favor of the enactment of such a rule by
Congress. The Rule as proposed addresses the concerns of litigants in cases
involving large numbers of documents 34 as well as the concerns of government
agencies and the targets of their investigations3 5 with regard to the possibility of
broad waiver of the privilege. However, the Rule as proposed also responds to the
very reasonable arguments that some care should be taken to review documents to
be disclosed in discovery and that a document should not be used in a way that
makes it unfair to claim privilege in connection with other related
communications. 36
Part II of this Article describes the treatment of inadvertent waiver in the
federal courts. Part III deals with the scope of waiver in the federal courts. Part IV
covers selective waiver. Part V discusses the constitutional ability of Congress to
enact a waiver rule binding on the states. Part VI sets out the Proposed Rule. Part
VII discusses drafting decisions made in formulating the Proposed Rule. Part VIII
concludes with a statement in favor of the Congressional adoption of what is
proposed as Federal Rule of Evidence 502.
II.

INADVERTENT WAIVER

Even a careful lawyer might overlook a privileged document produced in
discovery with thousands of others. Although the disclosure of such a document
may be intentional in the sense that the lawyer intends to hand over all documents
in its group, it is unintentional in the sense that, if the lawyer had considered the
privileged or protected nature of its contents, she would not have disclosed the

31. See discussion infra Parts V, VI.B.
32. See discussion infra Part V.
33. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE
RULES, FED. R. EVID. 502 (Proposed 2006), availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV052006.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2006) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT] (containing the
summary of the Committee's stance, the text of Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 502, and the
proposed committee notes).
34. See id. at FED R. EVID. 502 advisory committee's note (Proposed 2006).
35. See id at FED R. EVID. 502(c) (Proposed 2006).
36. See id. at FED R. EVID. 502(a) (Proposed 2006).
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document. The courts have generally referred to such an incident as an "inadvertent
disclosure."37

Courts have taken three different approaches to inadvertent disclosure of
documents during discovery: (1) inadvertent disclosure does not waive the privilege
even with regard to the disclosed document; (2) inadvertent disclosure waives the
privilege regardless of the care taken to prevent disclosure; or (3) inadvertent
disclosure may waive the privilege depending upon the circumstances, especially
the degree of care taken to prevent disclosure ofprivileged matter and the existence
of prompt efforts to retrieve the document.38

Perhaps the fewest number of cases take the first approach, finding no waiver
from any inadvertent disclosure. A leading case is Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene
Co.,

39

where a lawyer simply produced all of his client's files without determining

whether they contained privileged matter. 40 The court stated the following:

Mendenhall's lawyer (not trial counsel) might well have been
negligent in failing to cull the files of the letters before turning
over the files. But if we are serious about the attorney-client
privilege and its relation to the client'swelfare, we should require

more than such negligence by counsel before the client can be
deemed to have given up the privilege. No waiver will be found
here.4'

37. E.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 287, 290 (D. Mass. 2000)
("[C]ourts ... differ significantly with respect to the effect an inadvertent disclosure of privileged
information has on the claim of privilege."); Berg Elecs., Inc. v. Molex, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 261,263 (D.
Del. 1995) (finding a party inadvertently disclosed documents because the party "did not intend to
produce the[] documents."); Int'l Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445,446 (D.
Mass. 1988) (discussing inadvertent disclosure).
38. When there is a waiver of privilege, questions of the scope of the waiver also exist. Some
courts hold that an inadvertent waiver will waive the privilege with regard to only the document
disclosed, not to other documents dealing with the same subject matter; others hold even an inadvertent
waiver results in a subject matter waiver. See discussion infra Part III.
39. 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
40. See id.at 952 & n.2.
41. Id. at 955 (citing Dunn Chem. Co. v. Sybron Corp., 1975-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,561, at
67,463 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)); see also Berg Elecs., Inc., 875 F. Supp. at 263 (holding no waiver occurred
because there was no intent to produce where documents were marked privileged and then inadvertently
produced); Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448,451 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (holding no waiver
of privilege occurred because there was no evidence of intent to waive privilege). Texas has adopted
a no waiver rule through amendments to its Rules of Civil Procedure:
(d) Privilege Not Waived by Production. A party who produces material or
information without intending to waive a claim of privilege does not waive that
claim under these rules or the Rules of Evidence if-within ten days or a shorter
time ordered by the court, after the producing party actually discovers that such
production was made-the producing party amends the response, identifying the
material or information produced and stating the privilege asserted. If the
producing party thus amends the response to assert a privilege, the requesting
party must promptly return the specified material or information and any copies
pending any ruling by the court denying the privilege.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 193.3(d).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss2/2

10

Broun and Capra: Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in the Federal Courts: A P
A PROPOSAL FOR A FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502
20061
Despite its seeming ease of application, the no waiver approach has some
distinct disadvantages. It encourages the parties to be sloppy in their production of
documents-even in cases where the expense of careful production would not be
great. A no waiver rule also raises the specter of a party engaging in the
gamesmanship of "inadvertently" disclosing privileged information, demanding it
back, and then arguing that a party has made improper use of the privileged
information in its pleadings or arguments at trial.
A significant number of courts have taken the opposite approach. Among the
more frequently cited cases holding that an inadvertent disclosure waives the
privilege regardless of the circumstances is InternationalDigitalSystems Corp. v.
DigitalEquipment Corp.42 In that case, one lawyer, assisted by three paralegals and
thirteen of the client's employees, reviewed 500,000 documents.43 Privileged
documents were sorted through the use of "post-its," a system that obviously broke
down somewhere along the way." Twenty documents, totaling eighty-eight pages
later claimed to be privileged, were in fact produced to the other side.4 5 In
reviewing the waiver of privilege issues with regard to the inadvertently produced
documents, the court analyzed the three different approaches to inadvertent
disclosure.46 The court was particularly critical of an approach that analyzed the
precautions taken, noting that "[i]f the precautions had been adequate, the
disclosure would not have occurred."' 47 The court also stated the following: "When
confidentiality is lost through 'inadvertent' disclosure, the Court should not look
at the intention of the disclosing party. It follows that the Court should not examine
'
the adequacy of the precautions taken to avoid 'inadvertent' disclosure either."48
The court added that "a strict rule.., would probably do more than anything else
to instill in attorneys the need for effective precautions against such disclosure. 49
Among other cases, the court in InternationalDigital Systems50 relied upon
51
where the Underwater
UnderwaterStorage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co.,
following:
the
stated
court
Storage
The Court will not look behind this objective fact [of disclosure]
to determine whether the plaintiff really intended to have the
letter examined. Nor will the Court hold that the inadvertence of
counsel is not chargeable to his client. Once the document was
produced for inspection, it entered the public domain. Its

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

120 F.R.D. 445 (D. Mass. 1988).
Id.at 446.
Id.at 447-48.
Id.at 448.
Id.at 448-49.
Id.at 449.
Id. at 449-50 (citation omitted).
Id.at 450.
Id.at 448-49.
314 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1970).
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confidentiality was breached thereby destroying the basis for the
continued existence of the privilege. 2
As in the case of the no waiver rule, the absolute waiver rule has its
disadvantages. It may work an enormous hardship and financial burden on parties
in cases involving a large volume of documents. The penalty for a mistake in such
a case is multiplied many-fold where the court also finds a subject matter waiver
based upon the inadvertent production of an insignificant document. 3
The third, or balanced approach, criticized by the court in InternationalDigital,
is taken by many recent decisions. Several decisions cite the factors for determining
whether waiver occurs as a result of inadvertent disclosure,54which were first set
forth in Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co.:

What is at issue here is whether or not the release of the
documents was a knowing waiver or simply a mistake,
immediately recognized and rectified. The elements which go into
that determination include the reasonableness of the precautions
to prevent inadvertent disclosure, the time taken to rectify the
error, the scope of the discovery and the extent of the disclosure.

There is, of course, an overreaching issue of fairness and the
protection of an appropriate privilege which, of course, must be
judged against the care or negligence with which the privilege is
guarded with care and diligence or negligence and indifference. 5
In Lois Sportswear,the defendant inadvertently disclosed some twenty-two

privileged documents out of some thirty thousand its general counsel initially
reviewed.5 6 Considering the small number of privileged documents mistakenly
produced, the court found, "[b]y a narrow margin," that there was no waiver. 7

52. Id. at 549; accordHarmonyGold U.S.A., Inc. v. FASA Corp., 169 F.R.D. 113, 117 (N.D. I11.
1996) ("With the loss of confidentiality to the disclosed documents, there is little this court could offer
the disclosing party to salvage its compromised position."); Ares-Serono, Inc. v. Organon Int'l. B..,
160 F.R.D. 1 (D. Mass. 1994) (finding the party's inadvertent disclosure waived its trade secrets
privilege); Wichita Land & Cattle Co. v. Am. Fed. Bank, F.S.B., 148 F.R.D. 456,459-60 (D.D.C. 1992)
(finding involuntary disclosure waived the attorney-client privilege and work product protection).
53. See discussion infra Part III.
54. 104 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
55. Id. at 105; see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323, 332 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
(describing "(1) the reasonableness of the precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosure; (2) the time
taken to rectify the error; (3) the scope of the discovery; (4) the extent of the disclosure; and (5) the
loverr[each]ing issue of fairness." (quoting Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105)).
56. 104 F.R.D. at 104.
57. Id. at 105. The court noted the following:
[O]nly 22 documents out of some 16,000 pages inspected and out of the 3,000 pages
requested to be produced are now claimed to be privileged. Under these particular facts, the
evidence is barely preponderate that the disclosure of the privileged documents was
inadvertent and a mistake, rather than a knowing waiver.
Id. In contrast, the court in HartfordFire, 109 F.R.D. at 332, found the plaintiff had waived the work
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A persuasive analysis of the balanced approach, or "middle ground," is
contained in Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,5 8 a 2000 District of

Massachusetts opinion written by Chief Judge William G. Young. The court in
Amgen found a waiver of privilege, largely in light of the sheer magnitude of the
disclosure--"approximately

200 documents comprising 3821

pages.

'59

In

comparing its middle ground approach to the no waiver approach of cases like
Mendenhall and the strict waiver applied in cases such as InternationalDigital
Systems, the Amgen court stated the following:

In particular, each of the two rigid alternatives fails to take highly
relevant issues into account. The "never waived" approach, for

example, creates little incentive for attorneys to guard privileged
material closely and fails fully to recognize that even an

inadvertent disclosure undermines the confidentiality which
undergirds the privileges. Likewise, while the strict accountability
rule certainly holds attorneys and clients accountable for their

lack of care, it nonetheless diminishes the attorney-client
relationship because, in rendering all inadvertent disclosures-no
matter how slight or justifiable-waivers of the privileges, the
rule further undermines the confidentiality of
communications. . . . Providing a measure of flexibility, the
"middle test" best incorporates each of these concerns and

accounts for the errors that inevitably occur in modem, documentintensive litigation.6 °
In the end, the Amgen court found the lawyer's conduct in producing the
privileged documents to be gross negligence and added the following: "In fact, if
the Court does not hold that a waiver has occurred under the egregious
circumstances here presented, it might as well adopt the 'never waived' rule and
preclude such a holding in all cases."'"

product protection in light of the absence of reasonable precautions in reviewing "the small number of
documents involved." 109 F.R.D. at 330.
58. 190 F.R.D. 287 (D. Mass. 2000).
59. Id. at 293.
60. Id. at 292 (citations omitted).
61. Id. at 293. Other cases have also taken a similar balancing approach to inadvertent disclosure.
See, e.g., Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1433-35 (5th Cir. 1993) (attorney-client
privilege); Zapata v. IBP, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 574, 576-78 (D. Kan. 1997) (work product protection);
Edwards v. Whitaker, 868 F. Supp. 226, 228-29 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (attorney-client privilege);
Hydraflow, Inc. v. Enidine Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 636-37 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (attorney-client privilege);
see also Jennifer A. Hardgrove, Note, Scope of Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege: Articulating a
Standard That Will Afford Guidance to Courts, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 643, 659 (discussing the five
factors courts use when applying the "middle road" approach to attorney-client privilege); Ken M.
Zeidner, Note, InadvertentDisclosureand the Attorney- ClientPrivilege:Looking to the Work-Product
Doctrinefor Guidance, 22 CARDOzO L. REV. 1348-55 (2001) (discussing the intermediate approach
to waiver of the attorney-client privilege).
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The middle ground or balanced approach would seem to eliminate the
disadvantages of both the no waiver and absolute waiver rules. It is likely to reduce
the costs ofpreproduction privilege review without tolerating sloppy lawyering and
gamesmanship. But the persistent use by many judges of both the no waiver
approach and the absolute waiver approach makes predicting the applicable rule
uncertain at best.
III. SCOPE OF WAIVER

Under existing federal case law, a decision that an inadvertent disclosure results
in waiver with respect to the disclosed document may also waive the privilege with
regard to all communications dealing with the same subject matter. Similar to
determining the effect of an inadvertent disclosure, courts have used various
approaches to the issue of subject matter waiver.
Some courts hold that even where an inadvertent disclosure results in a waiver
with regard to the disclosed documents themselves, there is no waiver with regard
to other communications-even those dealing with precisely the same subject
matter.
For example, in Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn
Co.,62 the court found there had been a waiver of the attorney-client privilege based

upon an inadvertent disclosure. 63 The court found that both the strict waiver
approach and the balancing approach supported a finding of waiver.' However, the
court limited the waiver to the actual document produced:
Laying aside for the moment the question of whether the
attorney-client privilege has been waived as to the letter, the court
could find no cases where unintentional or inadvertent disclosure
of a privileged document resulted in the wholesale waiver of the
attorney-client privilege as to undisclosed documents concerning
the same subject matter.65
Even in the leading case for the strict approach to inadvertent waiver,
InternationalDigitalSystems Corp. v. DigitalEquipment Corp.,66 the court did not

find subject matter waiver.67

62. 132 F.R.D. 204 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
63. Id. at 209.
64. Id. at 208-09.
65. Id. at 208. Cases that held inadvertent disclosure results in subject matter waiver in fact existed
at the time of Golden Valley Microwave Foods. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980-81
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding inadvertent disclosure of one document waived the attorney-client privilege
with regard to "all communications dealing with the same subject matter" (quoting In re Sealed Case,
676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982))).
66. 120 F.R.D. 445 (D. Mass. 1988).
67. See id. at 449-50 (finding inadvertent disclosure "operates as a waiver of the attorney-client
privilege as to any documents disclosed by 'inadvertence"' (emphasis added)).
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In Parkway Gallery Furniture,Inc. v. Kittinger/PennsylvaniaHouse Group,
Inc.,68 the court used the balancing test to find waiver with regard to an inadvertent
disclosure. 69 However, the court noted the following:
The general rule that a disclosure waives not only the specific
communication but also the subject matter of it in other
communications is not appropriate in the case of inadvertent
disclosure, unless it is obvious a party is attempting to gain an
advantage or make offensive or unfair use of the disclosure. In a
proper case of inadvertent disclosure, the waiver should cover
only the specific document in issue.7"
Despite the strong language in cases such as Golden Valley, other courts have
in fact found subject matter waiver even where the disclosure was inadvertent. An
important case from the District of Columbia Circuit that reached this result is In
re SealedCase.7 In that case, the court took a strict approach to inadvertent waiver,
noting that "if a client wishes to preserve the privilege, it must treat the
confidentiality of attorney-client communications like jewels-if not crown
jewels."72 The court went on to say that the waiver of the privilege extends "to all
other communications relating to the same subject matter., 73 Although the court
noted that it would not disturb a district court's decision in the absence of abuse of
discretion, it remanded the case for clarification of the district court's reasoning as
to the dimensions of the scope of waiver.74
Other courts have applied a subject matter waiver but have limited that waiver
based upon the circumstances, often indicating a concern for fairness to both of the
parties. For example, in Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp.,75 the court applied subject
matter waiver but noted the following: "The privilege or immunity has been found
to be waived only if facts relevant to a particular, narrow subject matter have been

68. 116 F.R.D. 46 (M.D.N.C. 1987).
69. Id.
at 50-52.
70. Id.at 52 (citation omitted).
71. 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
72. Id.at 980.
73. Id.at 980-81 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982)); see also In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1356 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding inadvertent disclosure resulted
in waiver of the attorney-client privilege with regard to the subject matter of the disclosure (quoting
United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 145 (8th Cir. 1972))).
74. In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 981. Numerous district court cases also provide for a broad
subject matter waiver. E.g., Nye v. Sage Prods., Inc., 98 F.R.D. 452, 453 (N.D. Il1. 1982) ("Plaintiffs
secured no agreement from defendants that [inadvertent disclosure] would not waive privilege with
respect to other documents."); Malco Mfg. Co. v. Elco Corp., 307 F. Supp. 1177, 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1969)
(finding an attempt to reserve the attorney-client privilege ineffective).
75. 434 F. Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977).
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disclosed in circumstances in which it would be unfair to deny the other party an
opportunity to discover other relevant facts with respect to that subject matter."76
The more reasoned holdings with regard to the scope of waiver emphasize the
issue of fairness to the opposing party. Certainly, if the party making the disclosure
uses the disclosed matter to its advantage in some way, then the opposing party
should have the option of using other documents dealing with the same subject
matter that may cast a different light on the issue.77
The case law, especially the law involving the scope of waiver of work product
privilege, is illustrative of these considerations. The most important case on waiver
of work product privilege is UnitedStates v. Nobles.7" InNobles, the Court held that
the defendant would waive his work product privilege by calling his investigator
to testify about interviews with two prosecution witnesses.79 The district court
found that the investigator, if he testified, would have to disclose his report.8 ° The
defendant refused to turn over the report, and the district court precluded the
investigator from testifying.8 1 The Supreme Court held that the preclusion was
appropriate-if the investigator testified, the report would have to be disclosed.82
The testimony would waive the privilege "with respect to matters covered in his
testimony." 3 The effect of the Nobles Court's ruling was that, not only was the
work product protection waived with regard to matters directly reflected in the
report, but also to all related matters-a subject matter waiver. s4

76. Id.at 156; see alsoIn re Grand Jury Proceedings Oct. 12, 1995, 78 F.3d 251,255-56 (6th Cir.
1996) (finding a party's intentional non-litigation disclosure was waiver of subject matter of disclosures
but scope of the waiver was limited under the circumstances); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 981
(holding a determination of the subject matter of waiver "depends heavily on the factual context in
which the privilege is asserted"); Weil v. Inv./Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th
Cir. 1981) (concluding subject matter waiver occurred, but because the disclosure was made "early in
proceedings and.. . to opposing counsel rather than the court," the subject matter of the waiver was
limited to the "matter actually disclosed" and not related matters); Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp.,
77 F.R.D. 455, 461-62 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (holding waiver limited to specific subject matter of
conversation at a deposition); Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Blondis, 412 F. Supp. 286, 288-89 (N.D. I11.
1976) (holding disclosure at the deposition was waiver limited to the specific matter disclosed at the
deposition, rather than broader subject matter).
77. A claim of privilege where a party has used part, but not all, of the disclosed matter to its
advantage is comparable to a party claiming the defense of advice of counsel and then relying on the
attorney-client privilege to shield the remaining parts of its conversations with counsel. Courts have
held the privilege is waived under such circumstances. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 341 F.3d
331, 336-37 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding the party waived the attorney-client privilege with regard to the
entire subject matter of the disclosure). See also FED. R. EviD. 106, which provides that when part of
a writing is introduced, "an adverse party may require the introduction.., of any other part" of the
statement "which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it."
78. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
79. Id.at 239.
80. See id. at 228.
81. See id.at 229.
82. See id. at 239-40.
83. Id.at 239.
84. See Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. Nat'l Bank of Wash., 103 F.R.D. 52, 63-64 n.3 (D.D.C.
1984) (citing Nobles for the proposition that "the testimonial use of work-product constituted waiver
of all work-product of the same subject matter").
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More recent cases from the courts of appeal and district courts reflect a view
that subject matter waiver may be more limited than suggested in Nobles, and that
the limitation will depend upon consideration of fairness under the circumstances.
Reflective of that view is the Second Circuit case of UnitedStates v. Doe.85 In Doe,
a corporation had asserted attorney-client and work product privileges in its dealing
with an ATF investigation concerning sales of firearms.86 A corporate officer
testified and made references to advice of counsel.8 7 The primary question was
whether his references to advice of counsel and disclosure of communications with
counsel waived the corporation's attorney-client and work product privileges 8 The
Second Circuit noted that "the implied waiver analysis should be guided primarily
by fairness principles." 9 The court indicated that the district court, in determining
the existence and scope of waiver as a result of the corporate officer's disclosures,
should consider things such as the witness's lack of legal training and the fact that
the disclosures were made before the grand jury,90 where the corporation could gain
no benefit.9 Specifically with regard to waiver of work product privilege, the court
stated, "[W]e believe that the district court on remand should consider further
whether there was any waiver of Doe Corp.'s work-product privilege, and, if there
was, the proper scope of the waiver. The fairness concerns that guide the waiver
analysis above are equally compelling in this context."92 The court distinguished
cases finding subject matter waiver: "In this case, however, there was no actual
disclosure of any privileged documents. Further, the context-a grand jury
proceeding-is, as already indicated, quite different from settlement negotiations
or voluntary disclosure programs where the company, initially at least, stands to
benefit directly from disclosing privileged materials."93
In Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 94 the Fourth Circuit held that there
was no subject matter waiver of work product protection under the circumstances. 95
In Duplan, the parties seeking protection made partial and inadvertent waiver of
some of the claimed protected documents, which consisted of "mental impressions,
opinions, and legal theories of [their] attorneys and representatives."96 In refusing
to find subject matter waiver, the court distinguished Nobles on two grounds. First,
in Nobles, the work product was a witness's report, not the mental impressions of
a lawyer. 97 Second, the court noted that the party seeking protection had "neither
made nor sought to make any affirmative testimonial use of the documents for

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

219 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 179-180.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 186-87.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 191.
Id.
540 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1223.
Id.
Id.
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which the [party seeking production] claim[s] the work product immunity has been
waived. 98 The court also noted that the principles of Nobles may be applicable if
the documents were in fact used at trial. 99
The Fourth Circuit expanded its reasoning in Duplan in United States v.
00 In Pollard,the defendant in a criminal case sought documents from
Pollard.'
Martin Marietta, his former employer, relating to matters for which the defendant
had been indicted.' Martin Marietta claimed attorney-client and work product
privileges. 102 Defendant argued that Martin Marietta impliedly waived the privilege
because documents, or some portions of them, had been disclosed by the
corporation to the U.S. Attorney and the Department of Defense. 03
' The court found
a subject matter waiver of the attorney client privilege based upon the disclosure
to the government.0 4 With regard to the work product privilege, the court held that
the delivery to the government constituted a testimonial use of the documents," 5 as
in Nobles, and held Martin Marietta's disclosure was a subject matter waiver of
non-opinion work product. 6 However, the court held that there was no subject
matter waiver of opinion work product. 0 7 The court emphasized the added
protection given to such work product:
[T]he underlying rationale for the doctrine of subject matter
waiver has little application in the context of a pure expression of
legal theory or legal opinion. As we noted in Duplan, the
Supreme Court applied the concept in Nobles: where a party
sought to make affirmative testimonial use of the very work
product which was then sought to be shielded from disclosure.
There is relatively little danger that a litigant will attempt to use
a pure mental impression or legal theory as a sword and as a
shield in the trial of a case so as to distort the factfinding process.
Thus, the protection of lawyers from the broad repercussions of

subject matter waiver in this context strengthens the adversary
process, and, unlike the selective disclosure of evidence,
may
°8
ultimately and ideally further the search for the truth.

98. Id.
99. Id
100. 856 F.2d 619, 625-26 (4th Cir. 1988).
101. Id. at 620.
102. ld. at 622.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 623-24.
105. Id. at 625.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 625-26.
108. Id. at 626 (citation omitted) (quoting Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215,
1223 (4th Cir. 1976)).
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By analogy, cases involving the privilege against self-incrimination also point
out the possibility of distortion of facts if an individual were to waive the privilege
with regard to some matters, but claim it as to others."°9
In an important 1986 article, Professor Richard Marcus surveyed, in great
depth, the cases dealing with scope of waiver up to that point in time."o Marcus
argued that subject matter waiver should be analyzed in terms of fairness, stating,
"[T]he focus should be on the unfairness that results from the privilege-holder's
affirmative act misusing the privilege in some way.""' He also noted the
importance of not garbling the truth:
This article therefore concludes that the focus should be on
unfairness flowing from the act on which the waiver is premised.
Thus focused, the principal concern is selective use of privileged
material to garble the truth, which mandates giving the opponent
access to related privileged material to set the record straight.
...Contrary to accepted dogma that all disclosures work a
waiver, the article suggests that there is no reason for treating
disclosure to opponents or others as a waiver unless there is
legitimate concern about truth garbling or the material has
become so notorious that decision without that material risks
making a mockery ofjustice."'
Thus, although courts have different views with regard to scope of waiver,
there is authority, both in case law and in scholarly writing, for the position that the
scope of waiver should be governed by considerations of fairness. Subject matter
waiver makes sense where production of previously disclosed material is necessary
to protect an adversary from a misleading presentation of the evidence; it is
unnecessarily punitive in other instances. But as important as it is to adopt a fair
rule, it is equally important to have a predictable, uniform rule. Providing
uniformity in this area of the law would be a worthwhile pursuit.
IV. SELECTIVE WAIVER

Only the Eighth Circuit and district courts in other circuits have held that a
selective waiver of the attorney-client privilege applies whenever a client discloses
confidential information to a federal agency. 1 3 The First, Third, Fourth, Sixth,
Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits have expressly held that when a client
discloses confidential information to a federal agency, the attorney-client privilege

109. See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951) (finding a witness could not
testify that she turned over records to another person and then refuse to identify that person).
110. Richard L. Marcus, The Perils ofPrivilege: Waiver andthe Litigator,84 MICH. L. Rev. 1605
(1986).
111. Id.at1627.
112. Id.at 1607-08.
113. See infra Part IV.A.
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is lost." 4 The Third, Sixth and Tenth Circuits have held that disclosure destroys the

attorney-client privilege, even in the presence of a confidentiality agreement with
the federal agency. "5 Other courts have suggested that a selective waiver may apply
if the client has clearly communicated her intent to retain the privilege, such as by
entering into a confidentiality agreement."16
A.

Cases PermittingSelective Waiver

The court in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith"7 adopted a selective
waiver approach." 8 Diversified Industries had conducted an internal investigation
over a possible "slush fund" that may have been used to bribe purchasing agents of
other corporations to buy its product.' 9The SEC instituted an official investigation
of Diversified and subpoenaed all documents relating to Diversified's internal

investigation. 20 Without entering into a confidentiality agreement, Diversified
voluntarily complied with the SEC's request.' 2 ' Subsequently, Diversified was sued
by one of the corporations affected by the alleged bribery scandal.12 2 The plaintiff
in that suit sought discovery of the materials disclosed to the SEC, arguing that the
attorney-client privilege was waived when Diversified voluntarily disclosed the
privileged material to the SEC. 23 The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument,
holding that because the documents were disclosed "in a separate and nonpublic
SEC investigation . . . only a limited waiver of the privilege occurred.' ' 124 The
court explained, "To hold otherwise may have the effect of thwarting the
developing procedure of corporations
to employ independent outside counsel to
125
investigate and advise them.'
Some district courts outside the Eighth Circuit have adopted the Diversified
approach to waiver, holding that the attorney-client privilege may be selectively
waived to federal agencies even in the absence of an agreement by the agency to
keep the information confidential. For example, in In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Dated July 13, 1979,126 a Wisconsin District Court held that cooperation with
federal agencies should be encouraged and therefore refused to treat disclosure of

114. See Part IV.B-C.
115. See Part IV.C.
116. See infra Part IV.D. For a survey of the law governing selective waiver, see Nancy Horton
Burke, The Priceof Cooperatingwith the Government: Possible Waiver ofAttorney-Client and Work
ProductPrivileges,49 BAYLOR L. REv. 33, 39-59 (1997). See also Zach Dostart, Comment, Selective
Disclosure: The Abrogation ofthe Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work ProductDoctrine,33 PEPP.
L. REV. 723, 734-54 (2006) (discussing courts' different approaches to selective waiver).
117. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
118. See id. at 611.
119. See id. at 600.
120. Id. at 599.
121. See id.
122. ld. at 600.
123. Id. at 599.
124. Id. at 611.
125. Id.
126. 478 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
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privileged information to the SEC as a waiver of the corporation's attorney-client
privilege.' 27
B.

General Rejection of Selective Waiver

In UnitedStates v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology,'28 the First Circuit
held that the attorney-client privilege was lost when MIT disclosed privileged
materials to the Department of Defense (DOD). 12 9 MIT had voluntarily disclosed
documents to the DOD pursuant to a regular audit. 3 ' The same documents were
sought as part of an Internal Revenue Service investigation.' 3, In rejecting the
Diversified approach, the court explained that selective waiver was unnecessary
because "agencies usually have means to secure the information they need and, if
not, can seek legislation from Congress." ' The court added that applying the
general principle of waiver of privilege to any third party disclosure "makes the law
more predictable and certainly eases its administration. Following the Eighth
Circuit's approach would require, at the very least, a new set of difficult linedrawing exercises that would consume time and increase uncertainty."' 33
34
In the District of Columbia Circuit case of Permian Corp. v. UnitedStates,1
Occidental, (Permian's parent corporation) sought attorney-client protection for
documents sought by the Department of Energy. 3 ' Occidental had previously
disclosed the documents to the SEC. 3 6 The court rejected the Diversifiedapproach
and held that the privilege had been waived by the disclosure to the SEC.'37 The
court stated, "Voluntary cooperation with government investigations may be a
laudable activity, but it is hard to understand how such conduct improves the
attorney-client relationship."' 38 The court added,
The client cannot be permitted to pick and choose among
opponents, waiving the privilege for some and resurrecting
claim of confidentiality to obstruct others, or to invoke
privilege as to communications whose confidentiality he

his
the
the
has

127. Id. at 372-73. See also In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981), where the
court held that disclosure of privileged information to a federal agency does not always constitute an
implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 605. The court explained that, because the client
did not intend to waive the privilege and assertion of the privilege was not unfair, the client's
"disclosure of... materials to the SEC does not justify [a third party's] discovery of the identity of those
documents." Id.
128. 129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 1997).
129. Id. at 686.
130. See id.
at 683.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 685.
133. Id.
134. 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
135. Seeid.at 1215-17.
136. Id. at 1216.
137. Id. at 1220-22.
138. Id.at 1221.
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already compromised for his own benefit.... The attorney-client

privilege is not designed for such tactical employment.' 39

The Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Pollard' rejected selective
waiver of the attorney-client privilege where the privilege holder had previously
disclosed information in settling a criminal matter and in a DOD investigation.' 4 '
As noted earlier, the court also found a waiver of non-opinion 42work product
protection but no subject matter waiver for opinion work product. 1
C. Rejection of Selective Waiver even with a Confidentiality Agreement

Three prominent cases, from the Third, Sixth, and, very recently, the Tenth
Circuits, have rejected selective waiver, even when privileged material is disclosed
to a federal agency pursuant to a confidentiality agreement.
In the Third Circuit case of Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the

Philippines,43 Westinghouse had voluntarily turned over privileged material to the
SEC and to the Department of Justice (DOJ) in connection with investigations
concerning the bribing of foreign officials.' Westinghouse said that its disclosures
to the SEC were made in reliance upon SEC regulations, which provided that
"information or documents obtained in the course of an investigation would be
deemed and kept confidential by SEC employees and officers unless disclosure was
specifically authorized."' 45 The disclosures to the DOJ were subject to an agreement
expressly providing that review of corporate documents would not constitute a
waiver of Westinghouse's attorney-client and work product privileges. 146 The
Republic of the Philippines brought suit against Westinghouse alleging that
Westinghouse bribed a "henchman" of former Philippine President Marcos to
obtain a power plant contract. 47 The Republic sought discovery of the documents
Westinghouse had previously disclosed to the federal agencies.' 48 The court held
that Westinghouse had waived the attorney-client privilege by its voluntary
disclosure of privileged material to the SEC and DOJ. 149 The court noted the
following:

139. Id.(citations omitted).
140. 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988).
141. Id. at 623-24.
142. Id. at 624-26; see supranotes 102-10 and accompanying text. Another Fourth Circuit case
is In re Weiss, 596 F.2d 1185 (4th Cir. 1979), where the court, distinguishing Diversifiedas involving
private litigation, held that a lawyer's testimony before the SEC constituted a waiver of the attorneyclient privilege as to future testimony before a grand jury. Id.at 1186.
143. 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991).
144. Id. at 1417.
145. Id.at 1418 & n.4 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.0-4 (1978)).
146. Id. at 1419.
147. Id. at 1417.
148. Id.
149. Id.at 1418.
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[S]elective waiver does not serve the purpose of encouraging full
disclosure to one's attorney in order to obtain informed legal
assistance; it merely encourages voluntary disclosure to
government agencies, thereby extending the privilege beyond its
intended purpose. Moreover, selective waiver does nothing to
promote the attorney-client relationship; indeed, the unique role
of the attorney, which led to the creation of the privilege, has little
relevance to the selective waiver permitted in Diversified.
The traditional waiver doctrine provides that disclosure to
third parties waives the attorney-client privilege unless the
disclosure serves the purpose of enabling clients to obtain
informed legal advice. Because the selective waiver rule in
Diversified protects disclosures made for entirely different
purposes, it cannot be reconciled with traditional attorney-client
privilege doctrine. Therefore, we are not persuaded to engraft the
Diversified exception onto the attorney-client privilege.
Westinghouse argues that the selective waiver rule encourages
corporations to conduct internal investigations and to cooperate
with federal investigative agencies. We agree with the D.C.
Circuit that these objectives, however laudable, are beyond the
intended purposes of the attorney-client privilege, . . .and
therefore we find Westinghouse's policy arguments irrelevant to
our task of applying the attorney-client privilege to this case. In
our view, to go beyond the policies underlying the attorney-client
privilege on the rationale offered150by Westinghouse would be to
create an entirely new privilege.
The court also noted that "[i]n 1984, Congress rejected an amendment to the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, proposed by the SEC, that would have
established a selective waiver rule regarding documents disclosed to the agency."' 5 1
Relevant to the question of scope of waiver, the court in Westinghouse also
noted the following:
[T]he privilege is waived only as to those communications
actually disclosed, unless a partial waiver would be unfair to the
party's adversary. . . .If partial waiver does disadvantage the
disclosing party's adversary by... allowing the disclosing party

150. Id.at 1425 (citations omitted).
151. Id. (citing Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Support of a Proposed
Amendment to Section 24 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to Exempt Certain Records from
Disclosure Under the Freedom of InformationAct, 16 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 456, 461 (Mar. 2,
1984). The SEC proposed, but did not adopt, a similar regulation in connection with the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. See infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
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to present a one-sided story to the court, the privilege
will be
52
waived as to all communications on the same subject.
The court in Westinghouse distinguished between the attorney-client and work
product privileges and stated that a disclosure to another party might not necessarily
operate as a waiver of the work product privilege.'53 Disclosures in aid of an
attorney's preparation for litigation would still be protected.'54 However, the court
found that disclosure to the federal agencies in this instance operated as a waiver
because the disclosures "were not made to further the goal underlying the [workproduct] doctrine"' 155-the protection of the adversary process.'56
The Sixth Circuit, in In re Columbia/HCA HealthcareCorp. BillingPractices

Litigation,'57 also rejected a selective waiver doctrine for both the attorney-client
and work product privileges, even in the face of an express confidentiality
agreement. 158 In that case, the DOJ had conducted an investigation of possible
Medicare and Medicaid fraud.'59 Columbia/HCA had disclosed documents to the
DOJ under an agreement with "stringent" confidentiality provisions. 60 Numerous
lawsuits were then instigated against Columbia/HCA by insurance companies and
private individuals."'6 These plaintiffs sought discovery of the materials disclosed
to the DOJ. 62 Columbia/HCA raised attorney-client and work product privilege
objections. 163 The court expressly rejected the application of selective waiver for
either privilege under these circumstances."6 In rejecting the argument that the
confidentiality agreement precluded waiver, the court noted that the attorney-client
privilege was "not a creature of contract, arranged between parties to suit the whim
of the moment."' 165 The court further reasoned that allowing federal agencies to
enter into confidentiality agreements would
allow those agencies to "assist in
66
obfuscating the 'truth-finding process."1

There was a strong dissent in In re Columbia/HCA HealthcareCorp. Billing

PracticesLitigationby Judge Boggs, who argued for a selective waiver rule. 67 He
stated that "[a]s the harms of selective disclosure are not altogether clear, the
benefits of the increased information to the government should prevail."'168 He
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1426 n. 12 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1428.
See id.
Id. at 1429.
Id. at 1428.
In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 293, 307.
Id. at 291.
Id. at 292.
Id.
Id. at 293.
Id.
Id. at 302, 307.
Id. at 303.
Id.
Id. at 307 (Boggs, J., dissenting).
Id.at 311.
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added, "Faced with a waiver of the attorney-client privilege over the entire subject
matter of a disclosure and as to allpersons, the holder of privileged information
would be more reluctant to disclose privileged information voluntarily' 69to the
government than if there were no waiver associated with the disclosure.'
In 2006, In re Qwest Communications International, Inc. Securities
Litigation7 ° fell in line with Westinghouse and In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare
Corp. by refusing to adopt selective waiver despite the existence of a confidentiality
agreement. 7 ' In Qwest, the company had produced some "220,000 pages of
documents protected by the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine to
the SEC and the DOJ (the Waiver Documents)."' 72 Qwest disclosed the documents
to the government under an agreement that provided for confidentiality as to third
parties but also provided that either agency could disclose the documents in
furtherance of its "discharge of its duties and responsibilities."' 73 The agreement
with the DOJ specifically stated "that the DOJ could share the [Waiver Documents]
with other state, local, and federal agencies, and that it could 'make direct or
derivative use of the [Waiver Documents] in any proceeding and its
investigation."" 74 Before and after those investigations began, private parties filed
suit against Qwest in cases raising many of the same issues as those involved in the
government investigations.' 75 Qwest sought to protect the documents produced for
the government agencies against discovery by the private parties.' 76
The court held Qwest waived the attorney-client privilege and non-opinion
work product protection by disclosing the documents to the government agencies.' 77
After a thorough review of the existing case law in both federal 7 8 and state' 79
courts, the Qwest court reached the conclusion that "the record in this case is not
sufficient to justify adoption of a selective waiver doctrine as an exception to the
general rules of waiver upon disclosure of protected material."' 80 Specifically, the
court found that the record did not support the contention that companies will cease
cooperating with law enforcement absent protection under the selective waiver

169. Id. at 309-10. For further discussion of Judge Boggs's dissent, see infra notes 209-12 and
accompanying text.
170. 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006) cert denied sub nora., Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc. v. New
England Health Care Employees Pension Fund, No. 06-343, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 8627 (U.S. Nov. 13,
2006).
171. Id.at 1181.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. (citation omitted).
175. Id. at 1182.
176. Id.
177. Seeid. at 1181, 1182.
178. Id. at 1186-92.
179. Id. at 1196-97. Specifically, the court cited McKesson Corp. v. Green, 610 S.E.2d 54, 56
(Ga. 2005), and McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 812, 819, 821 (Ct. App.
2004), as examples of state courts rejecting selective waiver with respect to work product protection,
despite the existence of confidentiality agreements. Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1196.
180. Id.at 1192.
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doctrine.' 8' After all, 220,000 pages of documents were produced in this case "in
the face of almost unanimous circuit-court rejection of selective waiver in similar
circumstances., 82 The court found little support for Qwest's arguments based upon
the broad terms of the confidentiality agreements. 183 The agreements gave such
broad discretion to the agencies that the court concluded it was "not inappropriate
to conclude that some undetermined number of Waiver Documents ha[d] been
widely disseminated and ha[d] thus become public information."' 84 The court found
no basis to conclude that selective waiver would promote an exchange between
attorney and client:
If officers and employees know their employer could disclose
privileged information to the government without risking a further
waiver of the attorney-client privilege, they may well choose not
to engage the attorney or do so guardedly. Such reticence and
caution could be heightened where, as here, further disclosures by
the government mean
that the information may be disclosed to
85
countless others. 1
Finding no basis for selective waiver in the policies underlying the attorneyclient privilege, the court likened the doctrine of selective waiver to the creation of
a new privilege for materials surrendered in a government investigation.' 8 6 The
court found insufficient state support for the creation of such a privilege,8 7 unlike
the substantial state precedent for the creation ofa psychotherapist-patient privilege
in Jaffee v. Redmond.188 The court also found no basis for creating a new privilege
to guard against what the amici curiae (Association of Corporate Counsel and
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America) called a "culture of
waiver" established by federal prosecutors. 89 The amici argued that companies
facing federal investigations are coerced into waiving their privileges because of
the risk of "being labeled as uncooperative" by the federal officials.' 9" The court
found the record insufficient, both generally and in this instance, to justify action
by the court to seek to reverse the "culture" argued to exist by the amici. 9'

181. Id.
182. Id. at 1193.
183. Id.at 1194.
184. Id. at 1194.
185. Id. at 1195.
186. Id.at 1197-99.
187. Id. at 1197.
188. 518 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1996).
189. Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1199.
190. Id.
191. Id. Interestingly, corporate counsel argued before the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory
Committee that the same culture of waiver should cause the Committee to reject a selective waiver rule
because such a rule would put further pressure on companies to waive their privilege in government
investigations. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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Despite the court's clear and strong rejection of selective waiver in Qwest, the
opinion does not dismiss the possibility of a selective waiver rule created by rule
or statute. The premise of the court's decision was that the record was insufficient
to support the application of such a rule in this case.'92 But it added the following:
Whether a rule-making or legislative venue is appropriate to
address the issues raised by Qwest and amici is a question for the
Standing Committee and Congress. The rule-making and
legislative processes, however, need not proceed wholly
independent of the common law. The accumulated experience of
federal common law in the area of attomey-client privilege and
work-product protection is but another source for the legislative
and rule-making bodies to draw on to inform their deliberations
need for and parameters of selective waiver or a
concerning the 93
new privilege. 1
D. Recognition ofSelective Waiver Where a ConfidentialityAgreementExists
A few courts have indicated they would recognize selective waiver where the
disclosing party expressly reserves confidentiality before disclosure. The leading
decision taking this position, TeachersInsurance &Annuity AssociationofAmerica
v. Shamrock BroadcastingCo.,9 is from the Southern District of New York. The
court held that a waiver of the attorney-client privilege occurs upon disclosure of
privileged information to a federal agency "only if the documents were produced
without reservation; no waiver [occurs] if the documents were produced to the SEC
under a protective order, stipulation or other express reservation of the producing
party's claim of privilege as to the material disclosed."' 95 The court noted,
[A] contemporaneous reservation or stipulation would make it
clear that .. .the disclosing party has made some effort to
preserve the privacy of the privileged communication, rather than
having engaged in abuse of the privilege by first making a

192. Qwest, 450 F.3d at 1192.
193. Id. at 1201. The Standing Committee reference is to the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, to which the Advisory Committee reports.
Id.at 1200.
The court noted, in connection with its discussion of attempts to deal with the culture of waiver
issue raised by the amici, that Proposed Rule 502 had been published by the Advisory Committee on
Evidence Rules and would be submitted to the Standing Committee. Id. The Standing Committee
approved the publication of the Rule for public comment at its June 22-23, 2006 meeting. See Federal
Rulemaking, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/index.html#standing0606 (last visited Nov. 13,2006); infra
Part VI.
194. 521 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
195. 1d.at 646.
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knowing decision to waive the rule's protection and then seeking

to retract that decision in connection with subsequent litigation.'96

The Second Circuit, in In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P.,' 97 rejected the

Diversifiedselectivewaiver approach with regard to prior disclosures of documents
to the SEC which would otherwise have been protected as work product.1 98
However, after so holding, the court stated,
In denying the petition, we decline to adopt aper se rule that
all voluntary disclosures to the government waive work product

protection. Crafting rules relating to privilege in matters of
governmental investigations must be done on a case-by-case
basis. Establishing a rigid rule would fail to anticipate
situations ...

in which the SEC and the disclosing party have

entered into an explicit agreement that the SEC will maintain the
confidentiality of the disclosed materials. 199
E. The Possibilityof a Rule Providingfor Selective Waiver

The weight of authority is clearly against recognition of selective waiver.
However, policy considerations in favor of selective waiver may be strong enough
for Congress to accomplish by rule what the courts have been unwilling to do on
a case-by-case basis."' ° In the recent Qwest decision, the Tenth Circuit, although

firmly rejecting judicial adoption of selective waiver, conceded that a rule-making
or legislative body might well come to a different conclusion.0 1
As the court in Westinghouse Electric Corp. noted, in 1984 Congress rejected
an amendment proposed by the SEC to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934

196. Id.
197. 9 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993).
198. Id.at 236.
199. Id. (citation omitted); see also Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F.3d 1122, 1127
(7th Cir. 1997) (citing In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1983); Eglin Fed. Credit Union v.
Cantor, Fitzgerald Sec. Corp., 91 F.R.D. 414, 418-19 (N.D. Ga. 1981)) (finding that a claim of law
enforcement privilege could have been maintained after the government had disclosed information to
a third party if the disclosure had been made under a confidentiality agreement); In re Subpoenas Duces
Tecum, 738 F.2d 1367, 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (indicating that a company could "insist on a promise of
confidentiality before disclosure to the SEC"); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(rejecting selective waiver but noting that the record did not indicate the existence of a confidentiality
agreement); In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co., 161 B.R. 689, 696-97 (D. Colo. 1993) (holding that prior
disclosure to the U.S. Attorney under a confidentiality agreement did not waive the privilege against
a private party); Fox v. Cal. Sierra Fin. Servs., 120 F.R.D. 520, 527 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (following
Teachers Insurance,the court held the privilege was lost when the party disclosed information "without
steps to protect the privileged nature of such information").
200. See In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 738 F.2d at 1375.
201. In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc., Sec. Litig., 450 F.3d 1179, 1201 (10th Cir. 2006), cert
denied sub nom., Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc. v. New England Health Care Employees Pension Fund,
No. 06-343, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 8627 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2006); see supra text accompanying notes 192-93.
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establishing a selective waiver rule. 2 2 A regulation to the same effect was
proposed, but not adopted, in connection with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 203 The SEC
indicated that the regulation, although included in the final draft of the regulations
implementing Sarbanes-Oxley, was not adopted because of the SEC's concern
about its authority to enact it.2°4 In its final report, the SEC reiterated its position
that there were strong policy reasons behind such a provision, and for those reasons,
it still intended to enter into confidentiality agreements.2 5
The policy reasons behind the SEC's proposed regulation seem obvious. The
availability of selective waiver would encourage targets of its investigation to
cooperate more fully with the agency. 2 6 The same encouragement would exist with
regard to any agency investigation. 20 7 Not only would selective waiver benefit the
agency, it would relieve the target companies, which could comply fully with
agency requests without the fear that their privileged documents would be used in
private litigation.20 8 Private parties would be in no worse of a position than they
would have been if the target had not cooperated with the government agency.
Dissenting in In re Columbia/HCA HealthcareCorp.,209 Judge Boggs argued
that there should be a government investigation exception to the third-party waiver
rule. 210 He based his argument on the "increased access to privileged information"
that such an exception would provide. 21 He added,
[T]he choice presented in this case is not one whether or not to
release privileged information to private parties that has already
been disclosed to the government, but rather one to create
incentives that permit voluntary disclosures to the government at
all. In the run of cases, either the government gets the disclosure
made palatable because of the exception, or neither the
government nor any private party becomes privy to the privileged
material.212

202. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3d Cir.
1991); see supra text accompanying note 151.
203. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296,6312
(proposed Feb. 6, 2003), availableat http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 6312-13.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002).
210. Id. at 308 (Boggs, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes 167-69.
211. Id. at 311.
212. Id. at 312.
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The SEC's fears that it would lack the power to adopt a selective waiver
provision are not present if Congress adopts such a provision." 3 For reasons
discussed below, a congressionally adopted rule providing for selective waiver
would likely be constitutional." 4
V. BINDING THE STATES TO FEDERAL COURT RULES GOVERNING
WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE

If a statute or rule governing inadvertent waiver, scope of waiver, and selective
waiver of an evidentiary privilege is to effectively eliminate the need for
unnecessarily burdensome document review and rulings on privilege in mass
document cases, then the provision must be binding on all persons, whether or not
they are parties to the litigation in which the disclosure takes place, and in all
courts, state and federal. 15
In order to be binding in both federal and state courts, the rule would have to
be enacted by Congress. Through the Rules Enabling Act, Congress has taken from
the courts the power to adopt rules dealing with privilege. 16 A rule governing the
effect of the disclosure of a document during discovery, in the course of federal
litigation, could very likely bind all parties and courts under Congress's power to
legislate in aid of the federal courts under Article III of the Constitution. A rule
going beyond governing discovery and dictating the effect of disclosure to a federal
agency on parties not before the agency, as well as governing state treatment of
disclosure, would have to depend upon Congress's Article I commerce clause
powers.
A.

The Constitutionalityof a CongressionallyAdopted Rule Governing the
Effect of Disclosure of Privileged Matters in the Course of Federal
Litigation
1. Power to Bind the States in the Absence of a Rule

Even without a rule, a federal court probably has the power to bind state courts
with regard to waiver or nonwaiver of an evidentiary privilege, but the issue is not
entirely clear. There is no question that a federal court has the power to limit the use
of information obtained in discovery. Protective orders, especially those involving
trade secrets, abound and are universally upheld." 7

213. Indeed, Congress subsequently enacted a selective waiver provision for disclosures to
banking regulators. See Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 607,
120 Stat. 1966, 1981 (2006), PL 109-351 (Westlaw).
214. See infra Part V.B.
215. See infra Part VII.B. 1.
216. 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2000); see supra text accompanying notes 23-29.
217. See E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 103 (1917); Chem. &
Indus. Corp. v. Druffel, 301 F.2d 126, 130 (6th Cir. 1962); 8 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 2043 (1994 & Supp. 2006).
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However, limiting the use of documents or even information obtained in
discovery is different from ruling that disclosures or other actions taken in federal
court do or do not constitute a waiver of state evidentiary privileges. The most
significant case dealing with this issue is Bittaker v. Woodford.218 Bittaker is an en
banc decision of the Ninth Circuit involving the scope of a habeas petitioner's
waiver of the attorney-client privilege. 21 9 The district court held that the petitioner
waived the attorney-client privilege by filing a claim based on ineffective assistance
of counsel. 220 The district court, however, entered a protective order precluding use
of the privileged materials for any purpose other than litigating the federal habeas
petition, including barring the state from use of the information in a reprosecution. 22' The state appealed, claiming that the court had no authority to
prevent a state court from dealing with the issue of waiver of privilege under state
privilege rules. 222 A majority of the en banc court, in an opinion written by Judge
Kozinski, found that the district court's order effectively determined there would
be no waiver of the privilege in a subsequent state trial.223 The court held that the
district court had the power to determine the limits of the waiver and to make that
determination binding on the state courts.224 The opinion noted that a waiver
limiting the use of privileged communications to adjudication of the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim fully serves federal interests and preserves "the state's
vital interest in safeguarding the attorney-client privilege in criminal cases. '225 The
court further noted that "[t]he courts of California remain free, of course, to
determine whether Bittaker waived his attorney-client privilege on some basis other
than his disclosure
of privileged information during the course of the federal
226
litigation.,
On one level, Judge Kozinski's opinion is compelling from a policy standpoint.
Limiting the use of information covered by the attorney-client privilege to the
ineffective assistance of counsel issue appropriately limits the waiver to the scope
that is necessary to resolve the petitioner's claim. Arguably, the petitioner would
pay too high a price for his attack on the prosecution if the state was permitted to
use the information in a re-prosecution. Yet, the two concurring judges also make
a valid point regarding the power of the federal courts to deal with waiver of
privilege in a statute or rule such as the one proposed in this Article. Judges
O'Scannlain and Rawlinson concurred in Bittaker on the basis that the district
judge's order should not have been interpreted as dealing with the scope of the
privilege under state law. 227 Rather, the order should have been interpreted as

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
Id. at 716-17.
Id. at 717.
Id.
Id. at 717, 725.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 726.
Id. at 722.
Id. at 726.
Id. at 728 (O'Scannlain, J., concurring).
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preventing the use of information obtained in the federal litigation, but not
preventing the state from using the same information obtained from another source
if California law would so permit.22 8 The privilege law of California would govern
in any re-prosecution of the defendant; thus, the courts of that state should be free
to determine whether or not the privilege had been waived. 229 The concurring
judges argued that the federal courts have a right to limit the use of information
no power
obtained in connection with its litigation-as in trade secrets cases-but
230
to determine the application of a state privilege in the state courts.
At least one lower court has refused to issue an order having the effect that the
majority in Bittaker prescribed. In Fears v. Warden,23' the court, rejecting the
reasoning of the majority in Bittaker, ordered only that the state was bound to keep
the information obtained confidential and declined to decide the issue of waiver of
privilege in a subsequent state court proceeding. 32
Even though it is not a controlling precedent, Bittaker is useful in framing the
issues. Although, as the court notes, the case involves a waiver by implication
rather than an intentional or inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document, 233 the
case presents the issue of a federal court's power, at least in the absence of a
congressionally enacted rule, to affect the future application of a state court
privilege. As the divided opinion in Bittaker graphically illustrates, the extent of
this power is not entirely clear.
2.

The Power to Enact a Rule Dealingwith DisclosureDuringFederal
CourtLitigation

Although doubt exists regarding an individual court's power to issue an order
affecting subsequent state court proceedings, it does not necessarily mean a rule or
statute may not confer such a power. Arguably, an issue such as that raised in
Bittaker may arise from the absence of a common law rule conferring authority on
a court to make such orders binding on the state courts-an absence that the
adoption of a rule or statute governing the issue might correct. 34
A rule governing the effect on evidentiary privilege of disclosure of a document
in the course of federal court litigation would almost certainly survive an attack on
its constitutionality. Congress has broad powers to legislate in aid of the federal
courts, whether it does so through the Rules Enabling Act process or independently.
Congress's power stems from Article III, Section One and Article I, Section Eight,
Clause Nine of the Constitution, giving it power to establish lower tribunals, as well

228. Id. at 733-34.
229. Id. at 732-33.
230. Id at 735.
231. No. C-1-01-183, 2003 WL 23770605 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 9,2003).
232. Id. at *4.
233. See Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 719-20.
234. Congress can adopt a rule without going through the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072(b) (2000). Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415 were adopted in exactly that manner. See supra
text accompanying notes 23-30.
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as the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I, Section Eight, Clause Eighteen.

The broad power of Congress to describe and regulate modes of proceeding was
established early in our constitutional history.235

It is unlikely that a rule limited to disclosures made in the course of federal
litigation would be held invalid. Hanna v. Plumer23 established that the Congress's
power delegated under the Rules Enabling Act extends to matters "falling within

the uncertain area between substance and procedure, [but that] are rationally
capable of classification as either., 237 The Court has never found a rule invalid for
impermissibly affecting a substantive right.238 Although one may question whether
rules governing evidentiary privileges are procedural or substantive, even writers
who objected to the enactment of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence

governing privilege assumed the power of Congress to enact such rules and argued
against their adoption on policy grounds.239
The ability of the Rules to dictate state court action has been clearly
established. For example, a federal court determination of the preclusive effect of
a judgment controls state action with regard to that judgment. 24" Furthermore, the

federal supremacy principle has been applied to state procedural rules where federal
substantive law is preemptive.24

235. Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632,655-56 (1835); see Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 1,4-6 (1825). In addition, Justice Reed's dissent in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins is often quoted
for this proposition. 304 U.S. 64,92 (1938) (Reed, J., dissenting) ("[No one doubts federal power over
procedure." (citing Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 4-6)).
236. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
237. Id. at 472.
238. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The ConstitutionalLimits ofJudicial
Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated UnderFederalRule 23, 39 ARIZ.
L. REV. 461, 474 (1997) (discussing the limitation that "the Court cannot constitutionally employ its
rulemaking power to achieve such substantive aims," but noting that the Court has never enforced it);
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Badfor Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court Is
Doing a Halfivay Decent Job in ltsErie-Hanna Jurisprudence?,73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 978
(1998) (noting the Court's adherence to "its strong presumption of the validity of the Federal Rules").
239. See, e.g., Louise Weinberg, Choice ofLaw and the ProposedFederalRules of Evidence:
New Perspectives, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 594, 596, 599-600 (1974) (arguing for restraint on the national
lawmaking power based on national policies, such as "economy of federal lawmaking effort," "smooth
functioning of the federal system," avoidance of "disruption of settled local arrangements," and
avoidance of "duplicate sets of laws governing similar conduct."); see also Earl C. Dudley, Jr.,
Federalismand FederalRule of Evidence 501: Privilege and Vertical Choice of Law, 82 GEO. L. J.
1781, 1787-88, 1841 (1994) (arguing for an amendment of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 to provide
for deference to state privileges in most cases).
240. Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497,507 (2001); see also Stewart Org.,
Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 (1988) (holding federal law regarding enforceability of forum
selection clauses, not state law, governed transfers under 23 U.S.C. § 1404); Burlington N.R.R. v.
Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1987) (holding Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, not state law,
governed the issue of damages after an unsuccessful appeal).
241. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 153 (1988) (finding that federal civil rights law
prevented the state from applying its notice-of-claim rule in a federal civil rights action filed in state
court); Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952) (holding federal law
determines the validity of a release under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA)); Brown v.
Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 296 (1949) (finding that the federal pleading test should have been

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

33

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 2
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 58: 211
B.

The Constitutionalityof a Rule Dealingwith Selective Waiver

It is difficult to argue that a rule governing the effect of a disclosure outside of
the litigation process--disclosure to an administrative agency-is within the power
of Congress under Article III.
Despite Congress's wide latitude to enact procedural rules, which is established
both in the cases and the legal literature, Hanna's language would have to be
considered on its face-the rule would have to be rationally capable of
classification as either substantive or procedural. Fairly recent cases, although not
invalidating rules of procedure, have interpreted the rules somewhat narrowly
to
242
avoid application in a way that might conflict with state substantive policy.
A rule having an effect beyond disclosure in the course of litigation would
likely face a challenge that it could not be rationally classified as procedural. While
arguments in support of such a rule exist-for example, the most significant likely
impact of the waiver rules would be in the federal courts-there is significant risk
that a court would not find the rule binding against the states.
In order to provide more constitutional comfort for a rule dealing with
disclosures outside the litigation process, Congress's commerce powers must come
into play. A strong argument has been made for a federalized attorney-client
privilege enacted by Congress under its Commerce Clause powers found in Article
I, Section Eight, Clause Three. If the power exists to enact a federalized attorneyclient privilege, then presumably a rule that affected only an aspect of that privilege
(and its close relative, work product protection) would also pass constitutional
scrutiny. In his article, Federalizing Privilege, Timothy P. Glynn argues that
Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to enact a federal attorneyclient privilege law that applies to the states.243 He recognizes that the Supreme
Court has served notice that Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause have
outer boundaries, 2 4 For example, in UnitedStatesv. Lopez,245 the Court invalidated
as beyond the Commerce Clause powers an act making the possession of a gun on
or near school premises a crime. 24 In United States v. Morrison,24 7 the court took
the same action with regard to an act providing a federal civil remedy for the
victims of gender-motivated violence. 248 Glynn points out the obvious differences

applied in a FELA action filed in state court).
242. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612-13 (1997) (interpreting
settlement class certification under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23 in light of constitutional
limitations on the powers of Congress); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 429-31
(1996) (applying Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59 and the state law test for granting a new trial
on grounds of excessiveness); Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 96-97, 108-09 (1991)
(incorporating state law limitations on the application of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23.1,
dealing with the demand requirement in a shareholder derivative action).
243. Timothy P. Glynn, FederalizingPrivilege, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 59, 156-71 (2002).
244. Seeid. at 158.
245. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
246. Id. at 551.
247. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
248. Id. at 613, 617-19.
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between legislation such as that involved in Lopez and Morrison and a regulation
that arguably, at least, "fosters and protects .. .economic and commercial
activity ... between attorneys and clients."24 9 He adds that "[t]he attorney-client
privilege protects communications upon which the industry's article of
25
commerce-the provision of legal services-depends.""
Glynn also raises the possibility that congressional action might be limited by
Tenth Amendment considerations."' There are recent cases that place limits on
congressional action because of a violation of federalism principles. For example,
in New York v. United States,252 the Supreme Court struck down a portion of the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act because it, in effect,
required states to implement legislation.2 3 Likewise, in Printz v. United States,254
the Court invalidated a provision in the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act
that required law enforcement officers to administer a federal program. 5 5 On the
other hand, in Reno v. Condon,256 the Court upheld a provision of the Driver's
Privacy Protection Act that made no such demands on state legislators or local
executive officials.257
A rule adopting the principle of selective waiver and applying it to the states
would make no demands on the states like the legislation in New York and Printz.
The rule is self-executing. It would simply need to be enforced by the courts of the
state. At least one author, Anthony J. Bellia Jr., has questioned the power of
Congress under the Tenth Amendment to enact procedural rules unconnected with
substantive federal rights. 258 However, the legislation that was the focus of Bellia's
article, the Y2K Act, involved notice to defendants before commencing suie 5 9 -not
a matter as integrally connected to the regulation of legal commerce as the rule
proposed here. Arguably, the attorney-client related protections involve substantive
protections.26 ° The "privilege regulates, indeed protects and promotes, primary
conduct and commercial activity-attorney-client communications and the
provision of legal services-and serves interests wholly extrinsic to the litigation
in which it is asserted. 26'
One could argue that Glynn takes the concept of a federal attorney-client
privilege too far, both politically and as a matter of policy, by proposing a federal
law that totally supplants state attorney-client privileges. More modest legislation

249. Glynn, supra note 243, at 158.
250. Id. at 159.
251. Id. at 162.
252. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
253. Id.at 188.
254. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
255. Id. at 935.
256. 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
257. Id.at 151.
258. Anthony J. Bellia Jr., FederalRegulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L.J. 947,
970-73 (2001).
259. Id.at 954.

260. See Glynn, supra note 243, at 164-65.
261. Id.
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dealing simply with the existence and scope of waiver seems more likely to be
upheld, especially if the legislation is limited to the effect of disclosures made at the
federal level.262 Controlling subsequent use of matters disclosed in federal
proceedings or disclosed to federal regulators in all courts, state and federal, is
essential if such limitations are to be meaningful to the parties. As discussed in Part
VII.B, controlling disclosures occurring in state proceedings or to state regulators
is another matter.
VI. PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE 502: BACKGROUND OF PREPARATION AND SPECIFICS
OF THE RULE

Sections A and B provide a short discussion of how Proposed Rule 502 was
prepared and ultimately approved for public comment. Section C then sets forth the
text of the Rule and its intended application.
A.

Processof the Rule Proposal

On January 23, 2006, Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chair of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, wrote a letter to Ralph Mecham, Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, requesting that the Judicial
Conference "initiate a rule-making on forfeiture of privileges. 263 Congressman
Sensenbrenner explained the reason for seeking a rule on waiver:
I am informed that an absence of clarity on this subject,
particularly as it pertains to the attorney-client privilege, is
causing significant disruption and cost to the litigation process. I
therefore urge the Judicial Conference to proceed with a rulemaking that would * protect against the forfeiture of privilege where a disclosure
in discovery is the result of an innocent mistake;
* permit parties, and courts, to protect against the consequences
of waiver by permitting disclosures ofprivileged information
between the parties to a litigation; and
* allow persons and entities to cooperate with government
agencies by turning over privileged information without
262. The likely validity of such legislation dealing with attorney-client privilege or work product
protection may not extend to a statute that would attempt to apply the same rules to evidentiary
privileges generally. Perhaps one could argue that in many contexts the psychotherapist-patient
privilege has some effect on commerce, although the concept stretches one's imagination. It is even
more difficult to argue for a statute that would affect privileges for marital or clergy communications.
Other privileges such as those involving law enforcement and the qualified journalist's privilege may
involve additional constitutional analyses, including a determination of the impact of the provisions on
First or Sixth Amendment considerations.
263. Letter from Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chair of the U.S. Cong. Comm. on the
Judiciary to Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Dir. of the Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts 1 (Jan. 23, 2006)
(on file with authors).
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waiving all privileges as to other parties in subsequent
litigation.264
Congressman Sensenbrenner recognized that "implementation of such a rule
would require approval by an act of Congress in accordance with the Rules
Enabling Act" and that "legislation would also be needed to extend the rule's
protection to subsequent litigation in state court., 265 He concluded that a federal
rule protecting parties from waiver "could significantly reduce litigation costs and
266
delay and markedly improve the administration of justice for all participants.
B. InitialDraft ofProposedRule 502
In response to the letter from Congressman Sensenbrenner, the Evidence Rules
Advisory Committee directed the authors of this Article to prepare a discussion
draft that would respond to the Congressman's concerns. The draft was
intentionally written to provide broad protection against waiver and also to provide
a uniform rule on waiver for federal and state courts, no matter where the disclosure
of information occurred. The idea was to provide for the broadest possible
provisions and allow the Advisory Committee to cut back if it thought the draft
went too far.
1.

Text of the Initial Draft

The initial draft of Proposed Rule 502 provided is as follows:
Rule 502. Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product;
Waiver By Disclosure
(a) Waiver by disclosure in general.-A person waives an
attorney-client privilege or work product protection if that
person-or a predecessor while its holder-voluntarily discloses
or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged
or protected information. The waiver extends to undisclosed
information concerning the same subject matter if that
undisclosed information ought in fairness to be considered with
the disclosed information.
(b) Exceptions in general.-A voluntary disclosure does not
operate as a waiver if:
(1) the disclosure is itself privileged or protected;
(2) the disclosure is inadvertent and is made during discovery
in federal or state litigation or administrative proceedings-and
if the holder of the privilege or work product protection took

264. Id.
265. Id. at 2.
266. Id.
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reasonable precautions to prevent disclosure and took reasonably
prompt measures, once the holder knew or should have known of
the disclosure, to rectify the error, including (if applicable)
following the procedures in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(B); or
(3) the disclosure is made to a federal, state, or local
governmental agency during an investigation by that agency, and
is limited to persons involved in the investigation.
(c) Controlling effect of court orders.-Notwithstanding
subdivision (a), a court order concerning the preservation or
waiver of the attorney-client privilege or work product protection
governs its continuing effect on all persons or entities, whether or
not they were parties to the matter before the court.
Controlling effect of party agreements.-(d)
Notwithstanding subdivision (a), an agreement on the effect of
disclosure is binding on the parties to the agreement, but not on
other parties unless the agreement is incorporated into a court
order.
(e) Included privilege and protection.-As used in this rule:
1) "attorney-client privilege" means the protections provided
for confidential attorney-client communications under either
federal or state law; and
2) "work product" means the immunity for materials prepared
in preparation of litigation as defined in Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 (b) (3)
and Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 (a) (2) and (b)(2), as well as the federal
common-law and state-enacted provisions or common-law rules
providing protection for attorney work product.267
2.

Changes to the Initial Draft

After conducting a hearing on the draft rule, the Advisory Committee decided
to cut back on some of its more dramatic provisions.268 Part VII analyzes the
Advisory Committee's reasoning for its changes. The basic changes agreed upon
by the Advisory Committee were as follows:
1. Instead of providing a broad rule governing all waivers by disclosure, the rule
should provide for certain situations in which a waiver will not be found, even
though it otherwise might be found under common law. 269 Those situations
should track the concerns of the Sensenbrenner letter, specifically a) subject

267.
(April 24,
268.
269.

Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, Initial Draft of Proposed Rule 502
2006) [hereinafter Initial Draft of Proposed Rule 502] (on file with authors).
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 33, at 2.
See id. at 2-3.
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2.

3.

matter waiver; b) inadvertent disclosure; c) selective waiver; and d)
confidentiality orders.27 °
The controversy over selective waiver warrants bracketing that provision for
public comment, indicating to the public that the Advisory Committee has not
definitively decided to propose the provision, and would especially appreciate
public input on its merits, particularly on whether the rule is necessary or
useful to encourage cooperation and limit the cost of government
investigations.271
Comity principles warrant against proposing a rule that would extend to
disclosures made at the state level, that is, in state proceedings or before state
regulators. Control over state disclosures might come through separate
legislation, but the Advisory Committee found that a Federal Rule of Evidence
was not a proper vehicle for regulation of disclosures at the state level.272

The Advisory Committee did adhere to the following important policy choices
made in the initial draft:

1. Subject matter waivers should be found only if fairness so requires. The

2.

Advisory Committee determined that any broader use of subject matter waiver
would lead back to the unwarranted expenses that the Rule purports to
regulate.273
Inadvertentdisclosuresshould be waivers only ifa requestingparty can show
that the disclosing party failed to take proper measures a) at the time of
disclosure and b) in seeking return of the information.274 This is the
275
predominant approach to inadvertent disclosures taken by the federal courts,
and the Advisory Committee believed that this negligence-based approach
avoided the problems of either an "all" or "nothing" approach to inadvertent
disclosure. 276 The "all" approach-all mistaken disclosures are
waivers-unjustifiably increases the costs of preproduction privilege review.
The "nothing" approach-inadvertent disclosures are never waivers-could
encourage sloppiness, as well as gamesmanship by parties who claim that their
277
"inadvertent" disclosures have tainted their adversaries' cases.

270. See infra Part VII.
271. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
EVIDENCE RULES (revised June 30, 2006), FED. R. EVID. 502(c) (Proposed 2006), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/ExcerptEVReportPub.pdf
[hereinafter REVISED JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE REPORT] (including a footnote that was added to the Proposed Rule prior to being released
for public comment).
272. See id at FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee's note (Proposed 2006); infra Part VII.B.2.
273. See REVISED JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 271, at 2; supra Part I11.
274.

REVISED JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 271, FED R. EVID. 502 advisory

committee's note (Proposed 2006).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 54-61.
276.

REVISED JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 271, FED R. EVID. 502 advisory

committee's note (Proposed 2006).
277. See id.
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Confidentiality orders entered by a federal court must bind nonparties. The

Advisory Committee noted that if non-parties were not bound, the parties to the
order could not rely upon it in disclosing information for fear that a court could
find the information "waived" in a subsequent litigation-leading, once again,
to the heavy expenditures of preproduction privilege review that the Rule is
designed to regulate.278
4.

Federallaw onfederaldisclosuresmust be bindingon the states. The Advisory

Committee determined that while Rule 502 should not govern state disclosures,
it needs to bind state courts to the federal rule on federal disclosures.
Otherwise, the rule could not be relied upon by counsel determining the
consequences of a disclosure at the federal level.279
C. ProposedRule 502

The text of the revised version of Proposed Rule 502, as approved by the
Advisory Committee and the Standing Committee for release for public
comment,28 ° provides as follows:
Rule 502. Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product;
Limitations on Waiver
(a) Scope of waiver.-In federal proceedings, the waiver by
disclosure of an attorney-client privilege or work product
protection extends to an undisclosed communication or
information concerning the same subject matter only if that
undisclosed communication or information ought in fairness to be
considered with the disclosed communication or information.
(b) Inadvertent disclosure.-A disclosure of a
communication or information covered by the attorney-client
privilege or work product protection does not operate as a waiver
in a state or federal proceeding if the disclosure is inadvertent and
is made in connection with federal litigation or federal
administrative proceedings-and if the holder of the privilege or
work product protection took reasonable precautions to prevent
disclosure and took reasonably prompt measures, once the holder
knew or should have known of the disclosure, to rectify the error,
including (if applicable) following the procedures in Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(b)(5)(B).
[(c) Selective waiver.-In a federal or state proceeding, a
disclosure of a communication or information covered by the
attorney-client privilege or work product protection-when made
to a federal public office or agency in the exercise of its

278. See id.
279. See infra Part VII.B. 1.
280. See Federal Rulemaking, supranote 193 (describing the action of the standing committee).
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regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority-does not
operate as a waiver of the privilege or protection in favor of nongovernmental persons or entities. The effect of disclosure to a

state or local government agency, with respect to nongovernmental persons or entities, is governed by applicable state
law. Nothing in this rule limits or expands the authority of a
government agency to disclose communications or information to
other government agencies or as otherwise authorized or required
by law.]

(d) Controlling effect of court orders.-A federal court
order that the attorney-client privilege or work product protection

is not waived as a result of disclosure in connection with the
litigation pending before the court governs all persons or entities

in all state or federal proceedings, whether or not they were
parties to the matter before the court, if the order incorporates the
agreement of the parties before the court.
(e) Controlling effect of party agreements.-An agreement
on the effect of disclosure of a communication or information
covered by the attorney-client privilege or work product
protection is binding on the parties to the agreement, but not on
other parties unless the agreement is incorporated into a court

order.
(f) Included privilege and protection.-As used in this rule:
1) "attorney-client privilege" means the protection

provided for confidential attorney-client communications, under
applicable law; and

2) "work product protection" means the protection for
materials prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, under
applicable law.2s '

281. REVISED JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 271, FED. R. EVID. 502(c) (Proposed
2006). When released for public comment, a footnote was included after Subsection (c), which
provides,
The bracketing indicates that while the Committee is seeking public
comment, it has not yet taken a position on the merits of this provision. Public
comment on this "selective waiver" provision will be especially important to the
Committee's determination. The Committee is especially interested in any
statistical or anecdotal evidence tending to show that limiting the scope of waiver
will 1) promote cooperation with government regulators and/or 2) decrease the
cost of government investigations and prosecutions.
As the Committee has taken no position on the bracketed provision, it is
obvious that there is nothing in the proposed rule that is intended either to
promote or deter any attempt by government agencies to seek waiver of privilege
or work product.
Id. at6.
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The Committee Note to Proposed Rule 502, as revised, explains the reasoning
behind the Rule, the need for the Rule, and provides a justification for some of the
policy choices made by the Advisory Committee. The Committee Note provides as
follows:

Committee Note
This new rule has two major purposes:
1) It resolves some longstanding disputes in the courts about
the effect of certain disclosures of material protected by the
attorney-client privilege or the work product
doctrine-specifically those disputes involving inadvertent
disclosure and selective waiver.
2) It responds to the widespread complaint that litigation
costs for review and protection of material that is privileged or
work product have become prohibitive due to the concern that any
disclosure of protected information in the course of discovery
(however innocent or minimal) will operate as a subject matter
waiver of all protected information. This concern is especially
troubling in cases involving electronic discovery. See, e.g., Rowe
Entertainment,Inc. v. William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421,
425-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that in a case involving the
production of e-mail, the cost of pre-production review for
privileged and work product material would cost one defendant
$120,000 and another defendant $247,000, and that such review
would take months). See also [JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., SUMMARY OF THE REPORT COMMITTEE ON RULES OF
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 27 (2005)] ("The volume of [the]

information and the forms in which it is stored make privilege
determinations more difficult and privilege review
correspondingly more expensive and time-consuming yet less
likely to detect all privileged information."); Hopson v. [Mayor]
of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 244 (D. Md. 2005) (electronic
discovery may encompass "millions of documents" and to insist

upon "record-by-record pre-production privilege review, on pain
of subject matter waiver, would impose upon parties costs of
production that bear no proportionality to what is at stake in the

litigation").
The rule seeks to provide a predictable, uniform set of
standards under which parties can determine the consequences of
a disclosure of communications or information covered by the
attorney-client privilege or work product protection. Parties to

litigation need to know, for example, that if they exchange
privileged information pursuant to a confidentiality order, the
court's order will be enforceable. For example, if a federal court's
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss2/2

42

Broun and Capra: Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in the Federal Courts: A P
A PROPOSAL FOR A FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 502

2006]

confidentiality order is not enforceable in a state court then the
burdensome costs of privilege review and retention are unlikely
to be reduced.
The Committee is well aware that a privilege rule proposed
through the rulemaking process cannot bind state courts, and
indeed that a rule of privilege cannot take effect through the
ordinary rulemaking process. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b). It is
therefore anticipated that Congress must enact this rule directly,
through its authority under the Commerce Clause. Cf Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, 119 Stat. 4, PL 109-2 (relying on
Commerce Clause power to regulate state class actions).
The rule makes no attempt to alter federal or state law on
whether a communication or information is protected as attorneyclient privilege or work product as an initial matter. Moreover,
while establishing some exceptions to waiver, the rule does not
purport to supplant applicable waiver doctrine generally.
The rule governs only certain waivers by disclosure. Other
common-law waiver doctrines may result in a finding of waiver
even where there is no disclosure of privileged information or
work product. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Excel Corp., 197 F.3d 200
([5th] Cir. 1999) (reliance on an advice of counsel defense waives
the privilege with respect to attorney-client communications
pertinent to that defense); [B]yers v. Burleson, 100 F.R.D. 436
(D.D.C. 1983) (allegation of lawyer malpractice constituted a
waiver of confidential communications under the circumstances).
The rule is not intended to displace or modify federal common
law concerning waiver of privilege or work product where no
disclosure has been made.
Subdivision (a). The rule provides that a voluntary disclosure
generally results in a waiver only of the communication or
information disclosed; a subject matter waiver (of either privilege
or work product) is reserved for those unusual situations in which
fairness requires a further disclosure of related, protected
information, in order to protect against a selective and misleading
presentation of evidence to the disadvantage of the adversary. See,
e.g., In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1987) (disclosure of
privileged information in a book did not result in unfairness to the
adversary in a litigation, therefore a subject matter waiver was not
warranted); In re United Mine Workers of America Employee
Benefit Plans Litig., 159 F.R.D. 307, 312 (D.D.C. 1994)(waiver
of work product limited to materials actually disclosed, because
the party did not deliberately disclose documents in an attempt to
gain a tactical advantage). The language concerning subject
matter waiver--"ought in faimess"-is taken from Rule 106,
because the animating principle is the same. A party that makes
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a selective, misleading presentation that is unfair to the adversary
opens itself to a more complete and accurate presentation. See,
e.g., UnitedStates v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699 ([5th] Cir. 1996) (under
Rule 106, completing evidence was not admissible where the
party's presentation, while selective, was not misleading or
unfair). The rule rejects the result in In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d
976 (D.C.Cir. 1989), which held that inadvertent disclosure of
documents during discovery automatically constituted a subject
matter waiver.
Subdivision (b). Courts are in conflict over whether an
inadvertent disclosure of privileged information or work product
constitutes a waiver. A few courts find that a disclosure must be
intentional to be a waiver. Most courts find a waiver only if the
disclosing party acted carelessly in disclosing the communication
or information and failed to request its return in a timely manner.
And a few courts hold that any mistaken disclosure of protected
information constitutes waiver without regard to the protections
taken to avoid such a disclosure. See generally Hopson v. [Mayor]
of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (D.Md. 2005) for a discussion of
this case law.
The rule opts for the middle ground: inadvertent disclosure of
privileged or protected information in connection with a federal
proceeding constitutes a waiver only if the party did not take
reasonable precautions to prevent disclosure and did not make
reasonable and prompt efforts to rectify the error. This position is
in accord with the majority view on whether inadvertent
disclosure is a waiver. See, e.g., Zapata v. IBP, Inc., 175 F.R.D.
574, 576-77 (D. Kan. 1997) (work product); Hydraflow, Inc. v.
Enidine, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626, 637 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (attorneyclient privilege); Edwards v. Whitaker, 868 F. Supp. 226, 229
(M.D. Tenn. 1994) (attorney-client privilege). The rule establishes
a compromise between two competing premises. On the one hand,
information covered by the attomey-client privilege or work
product protection should not be treated lightly. On the other
hand, a rule imposing strict liability for an inadvertent disclosure
threatens to impose prohibitive costs for privilege review and
retention, especially in cases involving electronic discovery.
The rule refers to "inadvertent" disclosure, as opposed to
using any other term, because the word "inadvertent" is widely
used by courts and commentators to cover mistaken or
unintentional disclosures of information covered by the attorneyclient privilege or the work product protection. See, e.g., Manual
for Complex Litigation Fourth § 11.44 (Federal Judicial Center
2004) (referring to the "consequences of inadvertent waiver");
Alldread v. City of Grenada,988 F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1993)
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss2/2
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("There is no consensus, however, as to the effect of inadvertent
disclosure[s] of confidential communications.").
[Subdivision (c). Courts are in conflict over whether
disclosure of privileged or protected information to a government
agency conducting an investigation of the client constitutes a
general waiver of the information disclosed. Most courts have
rejected the concept of "selective waiver," holding that waiver of
privileged or protected information to a government agency
constitutes a waiver for all purposes and to all parties. See, e.g.,
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines,951
F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991). Other courts have held that selective
waiver is enforceable if the disclosure is made subject to a
confidentiality agreement with the government agency. See, e.g.,
Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association of America v.
Shamrock BrcadcastingCo., 521 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
And a few courts have held that disclosure of protected
information to the government does not constitute a general
waiver, so that the information remains shielded from use by
other parties. See, e.g., Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith,
572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977).
The rule rectifies this conflict by providing that disclosure of
protected information to a federal government agency exercising
regulatory, investigative or enforcement authority does not
constitute a waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product
protection as to non-governmental persons or entities, whether in
federal or state court. A rule protecting selective waiver in these
circumstances furthers the important policy of cooperation with
government agencies, and maximizes the effectiveness and
efficiency of government investigations. See In re Columbia/HCA
HealthcareCorp. BillingPracticesLitigation,293 F.3d 289, 314
(6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting) (noting that the "public
interest in easing government investigations" justifies a rule that
disclosure to government agencies of information covered by the
attorney-client privilege or work product protection does not
constitute a waiver to private parties).
The Committee considered whether the shield of selective
waiver should be conditioned on obtaining a confidentiality
agreement from the government agency. It rejected that condition
for a number of reasons. If a confidentiality agreement were a
condition to protection, disputes would be likely to arise over
whether a particular agreement was sufficiently air-tight to protect
against a finding of a general waiver, thus destroying the
predictability that is essential to proper administration of the
attorney-client privilege and work product immunity. Moreover,
a government agency might need or be required to use the
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information for some purpose and then would find it difficult or
impossible to be bound by an air-tight confidentiality agreement,
however drafted. If a confidentiality agreement were nonetheless
required to trigger the protection of selective waiver, the policy of
furthering cooperation with and efficiency in government
investigations would be undermined. Ultimately, the obtaining of
a confidentiality agreement has little to do with the underlying
policy of furthering cooperation with government agencies that
animates the rule.]
Subdivision (d). Confidentiality orders are becoming
increasingly important in limiting the costs of privilege review
and retention, especially in cases involving electronic discovery.
See Manual for Complex Litigation Fourth § 11.446 (Federal

Judicial Center 2004) (noting that fear of the consequences of
waiver "may add cost and delay to the discovery process for all
[parties]" and that courts have responded by encouraging counsel
"to stipulate at the outset of discovery to a 'nonwaiver' agreement,
which they can adopt as a case-management order"). But the
utility of a confidentiality order in reducing discovery costs is
substantially diminished if it provides no protection outside the
particular litigation in which the order is entered. Parties are
unlikely to be able to reduce the costs of pre-production review
for privilege and work product if the consequence of disclosure is
that the information can be used by non-parties to the litigation.
There is some dispute on whether a confidentiality order
entered in one case can bind non-parties from asserting waiver by
disclosure in a separate litigation. See generally Hopson v.
[Mayor] of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228 (D.Md. 2005) for a
discussion of this case law. The rule provides that when a
confidentiality order governing the consequences of disclosure in
that case is entered in a federal proceeding, according to the terms
agreed to by the parties, its terms are enforceable against nonparties in any federal or state proceeding. For example, the court
order may provide for return of documents without waiver
irrespective of the care taken by the disclosing party; the rule
contemplates enforcement of "claw-back" and "quick peek"
arrangements as a way to avoid the excessive costs of preproduction review for privilege and work product. As such, the
rule provides a party with a predictable protection that is
necessary to allow that party to limit the prohibitive costs of
privilege and work product review and retention.
Subdivision (e). Subdivision (e) codifies the well-established
proposition that parties can enter an agreement to limit the effect
of waiver by disclosure between or among them. See, e.g., Dowd
v. Calabrese, 101 F.R.D. 427, 439 (D.D.C. 1984) (no waiver
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss2/2
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where the parties stipulated in advance that certain testimony at
a deposition "would not be deemed to constitute [any] waiver of
the attorney-client or work product privileges"); Zubulake v. UBS
WarburgLLC, 216 F.R.D. 280,290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that
parties may enter into "so-called 'claw-back' agreements that
allow the parties to forego privilege review altogether in favor of
an agreement to return inadvertently produced privilege
documents"). Of course such an agreement can bind only the
parties to the agreement. The rule makes clear that if parties want
protection from a finding of waiver by disclosure in a separate
litigation, the agreement must be made part of a court order.
Subdivision (f). The rule's coverage is limited to attorneyclient privilege and work product. The limitation in coverage is
consistent with the goals of the rule, which are 1) to provide a
reasonable limit on the costs of privilege and work product review
and retention that are incurred by parties to litigation; and 2) to
encourage cooperation with government investigations and reduce
the costs of those investigations. These two interests arise mainly,
if not exclusively, in the context of disclosure of attorney-client
privilege and work product. The operation of waiver by
disclosure, as applied to other evidentiary privileges, remains a
question of federal common law. Nor does the rule purport to
apply to the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination.282
VII. DRAFTING

ALTERNATIVES

The Committee made a number of important policy decisions in drafting
Proposed Rule 502.283 The major choices, and the alternatives taken, can be
described as follows:
a.

Should the Rule determine when the privilege or work product protection
is waived, or should the question of waiver be left to the common law and
the rule focus on exceptions to the common law waiver rules? The
Advisory Committee ultimately decided to leave the basic question of

282. See id. at FED R. EVID. 502 advisory committee's note (Proposed 2006).
283. The authors of this Article were charged by the Advisory Committee to prepare a first draft
of Proposed Rule 502. The Advisory Committee reviewed the draft and took testimony from members
of the bench, bar, and academia as part of its Spring 2006 meeting. See supra Part VI.B (outlining the
first draft of the Rule). The Committee then conferred and agreed on a number of drafting changes.
These changes were implemented by the co-authors; the Proposed Rule, set forth at supra, text
accompanying note 271, was unanimously approved by the Committee and then by the Standing
Committee. In this section the authors attempt to describe the Committee's views, as expressed during
the Committee meeting and in the vote on Proposed Rule 502, but the authors do not intend to speak
for the Committee.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

47

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 2
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

b.

c.

A.

[Vol. 58:211

waiver to common law, so that the Rule is one that establishes exceptions
to whatever waiver rules currently exist.
To what extent should the Rule cover state court decisions on waiver? The
Advisory Committee ultimately decided that the Rule should not establish
a waiver rule or exception for any disclosure made in a state proceeding or
to a state regulator. However, the Committee found it critical for the
federal Rule to govern disclosures made at the federal level, either in a
federal proceeding or to a federal regulator, even if the information is
sought to be used in a subsequent state court proceeding. Otherwise, the
Rule would substantially undermine the predictability necessary for
counsel to determine the consequences of disclosure at the federal level.
Assuming selective waiver should be enforced, should the Rule require a
confidentiality agreement between the client and the regulator? The
Committee decided that a confidentiality agreement should not be a
necessary condition for limiting the scope of a waiver to a regulatory
authority.
Waiver Rule or Exception-to- Waiver Rule?

The initial draft of the Rule, subdivision (a), provided that any voluntary
disclosure of privilege or work product constituted a waiver, but that the scope of
such a waiver would not extend to related undisclosed material unless fairness
required such a drastic result.2 84 However, after the Advisory Committee hearing
on the Rule, the Committee realized that problems would arise if the rule purported
to establish that all "voluntarily" disclosed material constituted a waiver.285 First,
under common law, voluntary disclosures do not always constitute waivers.
286
Examples include disclosures to nonclients sharing a common interest;
disclosures to experts and others necessary for a lawyer's representation; 287 and
disclosures to corporate personnel on a "need to know" basis. 288 The Committee had
no desire to change these common law doctrines under which a waiver would not
be found. 289 Furthermore, if the Rule provided that all voluntary disclosures
constituted waivers, it would then be necessary to craft exceptions to that waiver

284. See supra text accompanying note 267.
285. See, e.g., HEARING ON PROPOSAL 502, supra note 19, at 36-37 (statements of Gregory F.
Joseph, attorney, and unknown male) (voicing concern over the initial draft of Proposed Rule 502(a),
which provided that all voluntary disclosures constitute waivers.)
286. On the common interest rule, see STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN &DANIEL
J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 501-35 to -37 (9th ed. 2006).
287. See, e.g., United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922-23 (2d Cir. 1961) (explaining that the
attorney-client privilege extends to communications to a nonlawyer when the nonlawyer is hired by the
lawyer and is necessary to the representation). '
288. See, e.g., FTC v. GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F.3d 141, 147 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting FTC v.
GlaxoSmithKline, 203 F.R.D 14, 19 (D.D.C. 2001) (finding no waiver of privilege where
communications are sent to corporate personnel on a need-to-know basis).
289. See REVISED JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 271, FED R. EVID. 502 advisory
committee's note (Proposed 2006).
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rule for each of these lines of common law authority, even though there was no real
controversy over any of these lines of authority and no real neccesity for their
codification. The Committee was not confident that it could find, and attempt to
codify, all of the exceptions to the basic principle that a voluntary disclosure
constitutes a waiver. There was legitimate concern that any attempt to do so would
be underinclusive and would result in an inadvertent and unwarranted change to the
common law waiver rule.
Second, there is often a fine line between whether a privilege has been waived
and whether a communication was privileged in the first place. An example of this
distinction is the Garner doctrine, under which statements made to counsel by a
fiduciary are not privileged as to the beneficiaries.2 90 One could credibly look at this
doctrine as either a waiver of privilege, or as a doctrine holding that no
communication from the fiduciary to counsel was privileged in the first place, as
to the beneficiaries, because of the expectation that the statements were made for
their benefit.2 91Another example is a statement made by a client to his attorney with
the expectation that it could be disclosed to the public at some later point-for
example, communications made so that the attorney can draft the provisions of a
contract. 292 One could credibly argue that this doctrine is grounded in waiver-that
the privilege is lost when the communication is disclosed to the public-though the
better analysis is probably that the communication was never privileged in the first
place because there was no expectation at the time of the communication that it
would remain confidential. A final example of the fine line between waiver and
privilege is the crime-fraud exception. 293 The crime-fraud exception has been
treated as a freestanding exception to the privilege, 294 but it could credibly be
examined under a waiver analysis; the client waives the privilege when
communicating with the attorney with the intent to further a crime or fraud.
Because of this fine line between waiver of privilege and whether a
communication is privileged at all (or whether there is some other exception), the
Committee was wary of attempting to establish a basic rule that all voluntary
disclosures constitute waivers unless there is an enumerated exception within the

290. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103-04 (5th Cir. 1970). For a discussion and
critique of the Garner doctrine, and its extension beyond shareholder suits to other fiduciary
relationships, see Stephen A. Saltzburg, CorporateAttorney-Client Privilegein ShareholderLitigation
and SimilarCases: Garner Revisited, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 844-47 (1984).
291. ld. at 1101.
292. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 342, 354-55 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding the
information used by counsel to prepare SEC filings was not privileged because all that was revealed
were matters communicated to the attorneys "for their use in connection with public disclosures which
made the communications and data underlying them non-privileged under the relevant case law");
United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871,875-76 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding communications were not
privileged where they were to be used by the attorney to prepare a public document, and where the
client did not impose a conditional limitation on the disclosure of the information).
293. For a discussion of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, see
SALTZBURG, MARTIN & CAPRA, supra, note 286, at 501-56 to -60.
294. Id.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

49

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 2
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:211

rule. The Committee saw a risk in unnecessarily altering long-standing common
law principles establishing the existence or nonexistence of a privilege.
Third, it must be remembered that the Rule is designed to cover waiver
consequences for both the attorney-client privilege and the work product protection.
It is unclear whether a voluntary disclosure of work product has the same
consequences in all situations as a voluntary disclosure of a privileged
communication. 29 5 For example, the common interest rule can play out differently
for privilege and work product protection: the nonclient must be pursuing a
common legal objective for the privilege to hold, whereas the work-product
protection may apply so long as the material is not turned over to an adversary in
litigation.296 The Committee was therefore wary about establishing a single
voluntary-disclosure-equals-waiver rule for both privilege and work product.
Finally, the Committee was concerned about merits of a general rule that a
voluntary disclosure constitutes a waiver. It is not obvious that every disclosure of
privilege that can be deemed voluntary, in the sense that it is not compelled by a
court order, should be presumed to be a waiver. For example, the American Bar
Association has charged that DOJ employs a policy under which a corporation or
individual will be threatened with prosecution unless privileged material is
voluntarily turned over to the government; the charge is that the DOJ gauges
"cooperation" by the willingness to turn over privileged material. 297 DOJ officials
have denied that there is such a standing practice, 298 but whatever the reality, this
situation demonstrates that reasonable minds can differ about whether a regulator's
demand for waiver of privilege (either as a standing practice or on a case-by-case
basis) results in a voluntary disclosure of that information.2 99 Although there is no
court order mandating the turnover of information, in reality, it often appears that
the client has no choice but to cooperate. The Committee did not want to interject

295. See Hopson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 233 n.8 (D. Md. 2005).
296. See, e.g., Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding
waiver of privilege, but no waiver of work product protection, where communications are turned over
to a regulator).
297. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Department of Justice,
to the Heads ofDepartment Components and U.S. Att'ys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations 6-7 (January 20, 2003), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business_
organizations.pdf (noting that "[o]ne factor the prosecutor may weigh in assessing the adequacy of the
corporation's cooperation" is a waiver of privilege and work product protection); see also TASK FORCE
ON THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 1, 13-22 (2005), availableat http://www.abanet.org/poladv/

report I I .pdf (opposing the allegedly routine practice of seeking waiver of privilege and work product
protection as part of any cooperation with the government).
298. See White CollarEnforcement (Part1): Attorney-ClientPrivilegeand CorporateWaivers:
OversightHearingBefore the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,andHomelandSecurityofthe H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1, 2-3 (2006) (statement of Robert McCallum, Assoc. Att'y Gen.),
available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/testimony306.pdf.
299. See In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 450 F.3d 1179, 1186-92 (10th Cir. 2006),
cert deniedsub nom., Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc. v. New England Health Care Employees Pension
Fund, No. 06-343, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 8627 (U.S. Nov. 13, 2006); supra text accompanying notes
171-192.
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itself into the politics of government demands for the voluntary disclosure of
privileged information; it chose instead to limit the consequences of such a
disclosure once a court determines it to be voluntary.
For these reasons, the Committee decided to promulgate a rule that would leave
it to the common law to determine whether a disclosure of privilege or work
product protection was or was not a waiver." 0 The Proposed Rule thus operates as
follows: Assuming that a disclosure is found to be a waiver under the common law,
there are certain situations in which the common law doctrine must be abrogated
or limited in order to protect against inefficient expenditures in litigation and to
provide some predictability for choices made in litigation.
B. Should the Rule Cover State Court Determinations?
1. Disclosures Made at the Federal Level: Subsequent Use in State
Proceedings
As discussed above, a major animating principle behind the proposal of Rule
502 is that parties and their counsel must be able to rely on the protections of the
Rule. For example, if counsel obtain a confidentiality order allowing each side to
take a quick peek of the adversary's materials without a pre-production privilege
review, they need to know that the confidentiality order is enforceable in any
subsequent litigation. Otherwise, the concern of a subsequent finding of waiver
would provide a disincentive for parties to use confidentiality agreements and
return the parties to the exorbitant expenses of pre-production privilege review that
the rule is designed to avoid. Likewise, with selective waiver, if counsel turns over
privileged material to a government regulator in reliance on a rule that doing so will
not constitute a waiver with respect to private parties, then counsel needs to know
that this protection will be enforced in any subsequent proceeding. Again, the
concern of a subsequent finding of waiver will provide a disincentive to cooperate
with the government.
The Committee therefore determined that any rule protecting against waiver for
disclosures made at the federal level, either in a federal proceeding pursuant to a
confidentiality order or to a federal regulator pursant to the rule of selective waiver,
would have to be binding at both the state and federal level. The Committee was
confident that any rule binding state courts to a federal statute protecting
disclosures made in federal proceedings was within Congress's powers.3"'

300. REVISED JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 271, FED R. EVID. 502 advisory
committee's note (Proposed 2006).
301. See supra Part V (discussing Congress's power to enact Proposed Rule 502).
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Disclosures Made at the State Level

The more difficult question is whether afederal law can or should control an
initial disclosure made at the state level. For example, assume state law provides
that disclosure to a government regulator constitutes disclosure for all purposes.
Despite the state rule and regardless of the court in which the issue arises, the
consequences of a disclosure made to a federal regulator would be governed by
Proposed Rule 502.302 But what if the disclosure is made to a state regulator? Is
there a legitimate justification for overriding the state privilege rule, and should the
law in this area be completely federalized?
The initial draft of Proposed Rule 502, prepared by the authors of this Article,
provided that the rules on waiver would bind both federal and state courts,
regardless of whether the disclosure was made at the federal or state level; it thus
opted for full uniformity.3" 3 The draft relied on a credible basis: that Congress has

the power to enact a privilege rule that governs disclosures wherever they are made,
whether at the state or federal level.30 4 Yet the authors recognized that Congress
might have the power to enact such a rule, but that did not necessarily mean the
Advisory Committee should ultimately propose a rule that would allow federal law
to displace state privilege law in all instances. After all, a concern for state
prerogatives led Congress to reject the Advisory Committee's original proposals for
federal rules of privilege.3"5 Thus, the authors drafted the Rule broadly to illustrate
to the Committee how far the authors thought the Rule could go, leaving it to the
Committee to make the policy determination as to how far it shouldgo.
The Committee believed that any federal rule that governs privilege for
information initially disclosed in a state proceeding would need an especially strong
justification. The Committee found no such justification. Most of the horror stories,
excessive costs of litigation on the one hand and disclosure to regulators on the
other, have arisen in federal and not state proceedings.30 6 Furthermore, it would be
a dramatic extension of federal privilege law to promulgate a rule that would, for
example, override a state rule on waiver even for a disclosure made at the state level
and offered in a subsequent state proceeding.
The Committee was also made aware of concerns expressed by the Judicial
Conference, Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction. In a June 21, 2006 letter to
the Chair of the Rules Committee, the Chair of the Federal-State Jurisdiction
Committee declared that the first draft of the rule

302. See REVISED JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supranote 271, FED R. EVID. 502(c) (Proposed
2006).
303. See supra text accompanying note 267.
304. See Glynn, supra note 243, at 156-71; supra text between notes 266 and 267.
305. For a discussion of the history behind Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and the rejection of the
Advisory Committee's proposed privileges, see SALTZBURG, MARTIN & CAPRA, supra note 286, at 501 8 to -12.
306. See Hopson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 238-44 (D. Md. 2005) (collecting
examples of cases, all from federal litigation).
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raised significant concerns for the Federal-State Jurisdiction
Committee, which includes three state supreme court chief
justices and a former chief justice. That draft would have
extended the proposed rule's protection to inadvertent disclosures
"made during discovery in federal or state litigation or
administrative proceLedings" and to selective disclosures "made to
a federal, state, or local governmental agency during an
investigation by that agency." Essentially, the discussion draft
proposed to federalize the rules of waiver and make them
applicable in both state and federal proceedings. The draft was
intended to facilitate consideration of a full range of options, but
the proposed application to state court systems would have
constituted a substantial limitation on the authority of state courts
to govern their own proceedings.3 °7
Ultimately, the Advisory Committee determined that it would be overreaching
to try to control disclosures made at the state level, and th-t it should focus on the
consequences of disclosures initially made in federal proceedings. If Rule 502
ultimately is proposed to Congress, the Committee plans to draft an accompanying
letter pointing out that disclosures initially made in state proceedings are not
specifically covered, and that if Congress wishes to cover such disclosures, it will
have to do so in separate legislation.
For its part, the Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction noted that the revised
proposal for Rule 502, governing only the effect of disclosures made at the federal
level, "avoid[s] the significant problems that would have been created by the
original draft. ' 30 8 In the context of the Rule's effect on inadvertent disclosures, the
Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction explained as follows:
As revised, the proposed rule could be viewed as a choice-of-law
rule, providing a federal rule to govern the consequences of
inadvertent disclosures that take place in federal proceedings, and
obligating state courts to respect that federal rule in later
proceedings in state court. Viewed in this context, the revised rule
appears less intrusive because it does not seek to impose on the
state courts a federal rule of what constitutes an inadvertent
waiver. Rather, it would require the state courts to respect the
federally-defined consequences of an inadvertent waiver that
initially occurred in a federal proceeding. Such an approach seems

307. Letter from Honorable Howard D. McKibben, Chair, Comm. on Fed.-State Jurisdiction of
the Judicial Conference of the U.S., to Honorable David. F. Levi, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the
E. Dist. of Cal. (June 21, 2006) [hereinafter McKibben Letter] (on file with authors) (quoting Initial
Draft of Proposed Rule 502, supra note 267).
308. McKibben Letter, supra note 307, at 2.
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consistent with principles of federalism and comity that exist
between the federal and state court systems.3 °9
3.

Disclosuresat the State Level: Subsequent Use in FederalCourt

This is not to say that an initial disclosure in a state proceeding or to a state
regulator is necessarily controlled by state law if the information is later demanded
in afederal proceeding. Under Rule 501, privileges in federal question cases are
determined by federal common law or federal statute; where state law provides the
rule of decision, privilege is governed by state law.31° If enacted in its current form,
Rule 502 would provide four important federal rules on waiver, but only for
disclosures made at the federal level: (1) no subject matter waiver unless
undisclosed information ought in fairness to be disclosed; (2) mistaken disclosures
are not waivers unless there was negligence in the disclosure and in the failure to
seek return; (3) disclosure to a regulator does not operate as a waiver to private
parties; and (4) courts can enter confidentiality orders that will bind non-parties,
depriving them of the opportunity to argue that a waiver occurred if the disclosure
"
' What happens if (1) a disclosure is
was in accordance with the court's order.31
made at the state level (in a state court proceeding or to a state regulator); (2) the
state law of waiver is different from Rule 502 (in one of the four respects set forth
above); and (3) a party seeks to rely on the state law of waiver in a subsequent
federal proceeding?
The answers are somewhat complicated, but appear to be as follows:
1. Subject Matter Waiver: If the state law would find a subject matter waiver for
a state disclosure where Rule 502 would not, a party could argue in federal
court that state law mandates subject matter waiver, even though fairness does
not require it. If the subsequent federal case lies in diversity, then it appears
that this argument would be meritorious. 312 The federal court would have to
find a subject matter waiver because state law provides the rule on privileges
under Rule 501.313 If it is a federal question case, then a finding on subject

309. Id. It should be noted, however, that the Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee ultimately
reserved judgment even on the pared-down version of Rule 502 as released for public comment. Some
members of the Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee expressed concern that "requiring all states to
adhere to a uniform rule based upon the treatment of disclosures in the course of federal litigation may
undermine the traditional control that state courts have exercised over the application of waiver rules."
Id. at 3. The Committee also noted that some of its members "took the position that state courts should
be free to determine what constitutes a waiver, even where the waiver occurred in an earlier federal
proceeding." Id.
310. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
311. REVISED JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 271, FED. R. EVID. 502 (Proposed
2006).
312. See FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee's note.
313. See id.
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2.

3.

matter waiver would depend on federal common law;3 14 Rule 502 does not
govern because it applies only to disclosures made at the federal level." 5
The federal common law on subject matter waiver was previously
discussed, and as noted, the federal courts are not uniform.31 6 This means that
in federal question cases, the existence of a subject matter waiver for
disclosures initially made at the state level may vary from court to court
(though it might be hoped that the common law will fall into a uniform line
because of the persuasive effect of Rule 502).
Inadvertent Disclosures: Assume that a party makes a mistaken disclosure in
a state proceeding with a waiver rule different from that provided in Rule 502.
For example, the state law mandates that a mistaken disclosure is always a
waiver. Will that state rule be enforced in a subsequent federal proceeding?
The answer is Yes if the action lies in diversity; as previously explained, Rule
501 provides that state law of privilege applies in diversity, and the waiver
standard in Rule 502 does not control because it applies only to disclosures
made at the federal level. If it is a federal question case, the effect of the
disclosure will be governed by federal common law, which is not uniform. But
again, it can be hoped that the federal common law, as applicable in this
narrow area, will eventually come into line with Proposed Rule 502's standard
for federal disclosure.
Selective Waiver: Rule 502 would have some effect on disclosures initially
made to state regulators and offered by private parties in subsequent federal
proceedings. The selective waiver provision of Rule 502 currently provides
specific language indicating that the effect of a state disclosure to a regulator
is governed by state law.317 If this language ultimately is enacted, it would
mean that, as a matter of federal law, the effect in a federal proceeding of a
disclosure made to a state regulator is governed by state law. Thus, the
proposed language incorporates the relevant state law on waiver and makes it
federal law for this particular purpose. As such, it overrides the federal
common law that would otherwise apply. The applicable state law on waiver
would thus apply in both state and federal cases."'

314. See id.
315. See REVISED JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 271, FED. R. EVID. 502(c)
(Proposed 2006).
316. See supra Part Il.
317. See REVISED JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 271, FED. R. EVID. 502(c)
(Proposed 2006).
318. It is possible that the language of the Rule, deferring to state law as a matter of federal law,
could create a problem if there are disclosures to regulators in a number of states, and the state law on
waiver is different in those states. For example, assume that a corporation discloses privileged
information to a regulator in State 1, where the disclosure operates as a waiver to private parties, and
discloses the same information to a regulator in State 2, where disclosure does not operate as a waiver
to private parties. If an action is now brought in federal court by a private party, does that private party
get the information? Proposed Rule 502 provides that the effect of a waiver is governed by state law,
but which state's law is applicable? Presumably the answer is found in federal common law choice of
law rules.
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One might ask why state law is incorporated into federal law for purposes
of selective waiver, but federal common law applies for the other matters
addressed by Proposed Rule 502, specifically subject matter waiver and
inadvertent disclosure. It must be said that the Committee, in adding language
concerning the applicability of state law to disclosure to state regulators, did
not consider in detail the choice of law questions that arise with respect to
subject matter waiver and inadvertent disclosure. These are the kinds of
complexities that are sorted out in the public comment period. The Committee

might decide that special treatment is necessary for selective waiver, given the
controversy over that doctrine. It might be thought too drastically contrary to
comity to impose a federal law based on the premise of limiting the costs of
government investigations, where the investigation is being pursued by a state
entity in a state without a selective waiver provision. Shouldn't the decision of
whether selective waiver is useful in limiting the cost of state investigations be
left to the state?

19

It is also possible that the Committee will decide that uniform choice of
law treatment is necessary with regard to subject matter waiver, inadvertent
waiver, and selective waiver as to disclosures made at the state level where use

is sought in subsequent federal proceedings. This decision can be adopted in
one of three ways:

a.

The language in the selective waiver subdivision providing that "[t]he
effect of disclosure to a state or local government agency, with respect to
non-governmental persons or entities, is governed by applicable state

law"3 1 could be deleted. This modification would give selective waiver the
same choice of law rule as subject matter waiver and inadvertent waiver;
where the disclosure is made at the state level and the protected

A different problem under Proposed Rule 502 arises when the corporation discloses privileged
material to both a federal and state regulator, and the state disclosure is made in a state that does not
recognize selective waiver. In a subsequent federal action brought by a private party, does the private
party get access to the privileged material? Here the question is not really one of choice of law, since
it is clear that federal law governs under Rule 501. See FED. R. EVID. 501. The problem is that the
Proposed Rule provides different consequences for state and federal disclosures. See REVISED JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 271, FED. R. EvID. 502(c) (Proposed 2006). If Rule 502 is enacted
in its current form, it will probably mean that any disclosure to a state regulator in a state without a
selective waiver rule will operate as a waiver to private parties, even if the disclosure would be
protected insofar as it was made to a federal regulator.
This is not an anomalous result. It simply means that federal legislation is deferring to state
prerogatives concerning the effect of disclosures of privileged information when made at the state level.
As a practical matter, it means that counsel needs to inform the client that any disclosure to a state
regulator in a state without a selective waiver rule will likely constitute a complete waiver to private
parties, even in subsequent federal litigation.
319. This assumes, of course, that selective waiver will become a part of Rule 502. As released
for public comment, the selective waiver provision is in brackets. The Committee is seeking public
comment, but it has not yet decided on the merits of selective waiver. See supra note 281.
320. REVISED JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 271, FED. R. EVID. 502(c) (Proposed

2006).
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information is offered in a federal proceeding, the state waiver rule would
govern diversity cases and the federal common law waiver rule would
govern federal question cases.
b. The language in the selective waiver subdivision providing that "[t]he
effect of disclosure [at the state level] is governed by applicable state
law ' 32' could be replicated in the provisions governing subject matter
waiver and inadvertent waiver. The result of this modification would be
that the choice of law rule for all three provisions would be consistent, but
the actual law chosen would be different from the first option above for
federal question cases. This change suggests that state law would
determine waiver where the disclosure occurs at the state level and the
protected information is proffered in a subsequent federal proceeding. This
result would give primacy to comity principles, but it might result in
increased uncertainty for counsel in determining whether to rely on Rule
502.
c. The Proposed Rule could be changed to provide that if disclosure is made
at the state level, its effect in a subsequent federal proceeding is governed
by Rule 502. For example, if a disclosure is made in a state proceeding in
a state in which inadvertent disclosures are always waivers, the use of the
disclosed information in a subsequent federal proceeding would not be
automatic and would depend on whether the standards of Rule 502 have
or have not been met (whether the party reasonably guarded against
disclosure and diligently sought return of the protected information). This
option would provide the greatest certainty for parties because they would
know they could rely on Rule 502 whether the disclosure of protected
information was made at the federal or state level. 322 This option, however,
is the most offensive to comity principles because it overrides state law on
privileges even where disclosures are made at the state level. While
Congress may wish to enact such a law, it may be difficult for the
Advisory Committee to propose a rule overriding state law as to state
disclosures, given the concerns of the Judicial Conference Committee on
Federal-State Jurisdiction.323
4. Confidentiality Orders: Proposed Rule 502 does not purport to determine the
effect of a confidentiality order that is entered by a state court when the
information is sought in a subsequent federal proceeding. 32 Nor does Rule 501
apply. 325 The enforceability in federal court of a state court order is not a

321. Id.
322. Id.at FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee's note (Proposed 2006) (emphasizing that Rule
502 does not apply to state disclosures later offered in state litigation).
323. See supra text at notes 307-09 (discussing concerns expressed by the Judicial Conference
Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction).
324. See REVISED JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 271, FED. R. EVID. 502(d)
(Proposed 2006) (dealing, in subsection (d), only with federal court orders that incorporate parties'
confidentiality agreements).
325. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
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question of privilege at all, but rather is governed by law providing the respect
that federal courts must give to state court determinations. 326 Neither Rule 501
nor Rule 502 purports to alter that longstanding body of law.
4.

FederalRule ofEvidence Governing Use in State Courts?

As discussed above, Proposed Rule 502 does not attempt to impose federal law
when disclosures are made at the state level, but it does bind state courts to a
uniform federal rule when disclosures are initially made at thefederal level. Is it
appropriate for a Federal Rule of Evidence to extend its reach to a state court
determination? To clarify, the question raised at this point is not whether Congress
has the power to enact such a rule; the question instead is whether it is advisable to
place such a rule in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
There is undeniably some tension between Proposed Rule 502 and Federal Rule
of Evidence 1101(a), which states that the rules apply to "the United States district
courts."327 One might argue that Rule 1101 (c) resolves any anomaly by providing
3 28
that rules of privilege apply to "all stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings.
But one could also argue that the term "all" is implicitly limited by subdivision (a),
which refers to federal proceedings only.329
Given the fact that it is critical to cover both state and federal proceedings with
the same waiver standards, at least as to disclosures initially made in a federal
context, is there any drafting alternative to that taken in Proposed Rule 502? One
alternative would be simply to cover only federal proceedings in the Rule and leave
state proceedings to parallel legislation adopted by Congress. This alternative
would eliminate all references to state proceedings from the Rule, and a separate
letter to Congress would stress the need for conforming legislation that covers state
proceedings.
The Committee decided to include state proceedings within the text of the rule,
at least at this point, to make the public aware that there is an explicit intent to
cover state proceedings in any legislative attempt to promulgate a rule protecting
against waiver when the disclosure is initially made at the federal level. That intent
would not be as clear if the references to state proceedings were taken out of the
text of the draft and left to an explanation in some kind of covering letter. The
Committee thought it better to provide notice about the reach of the rule in the text
of the rule, and to leave it to Congress to determine whether to enact a single rule

326. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000) (providing that state judicial proceedings "shall have the
same full faith and credit in every court within the United States... as they have by law or usage in the
courts of such State... from which they are taken"; see also 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 26.106[ 1] n.5.2 (3d ed. 2006) (citing Tucker v. Ohtsu Tire & Rubber Co., 191
F.R.D. 495, 499 (D. Md. 2000)) (noting that "courts asked to modify another court's protective order
are constrained by principles of comity, courtesy, and, when a court is asked to take action with regard
to a previously issued state court protective order, federalism").
327. FED. R. EVID. l101(a).
328. FED. R. EvID. l101(c).
329. FED. R. EvID. l101(a).
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or parallel legislation binding state courts. The Committee intends to make it clear
to Congress that whatever path it takes regarding this legislation, it is critical that
states must be bound by the federal rule governing disclosures made at the federal
level.
C. Enforcing Selective Waiver Even Without a Confidentiality Agreement
As discussed above, a number of courts suggest that they would enforce
selective waiver only if the client has entered into a confidentiality agreement with
the government regulator. 330 A few courts enforce selective waiver even without
such an agreement.' The Committee has not taken a final position on selective
waiver; the language in Rule 502 providing for selective waiver has been bracketed,
meaning that the Committee is undecided and is including the provision in order to
obtain public comment on the issue. This is not surprising, as the selective waiver
provision is clearly the most controversial provision in the Proposed Rule.332
The Committee has decided, however, that if a selective waiver provision is
included, the provision should not require confidentiality agreements as a condition
for protection against a full waiver. The Committee concluded that a confidentiality
agreement requirement would not fully implement the policy of encouraging
cooperation with government investigations, the animating principle of any rule
enforcing selective waiver. The Committee came to this conclusion for several
reasons.
First, the term "confidentiality agreement" is not self defining; many
agreements entered into by the SEC contain only conditional confidentiality
language.333 The conditions include the possibility that the privileged material will
be disclosed to other law enforcement officials, and that the confidentiality is
maintained "except to the extent that the Staff determines that disclosure is
otherwise required by federal law or in furtherance of the SEC's discharge of its
duties and responsibilities. 33 4 The Committee concluded that the SEC needs the
flexibility provided by these conditions to fulfill its enforcement obligations; the
SEC could not be bound to absolute nondisclosure.
The conditional confidentiality agreements currently in play are not very
relevant to the question of whether to enforce a selective waiver. The rationale for
conditioning selective waiver on a confidentiality agreement is that the party
appears to be trying to limit the breadth of the disclosure of the protected
information-that is, the party is not trying to abuse the privilege by authorizing

330. See supra text accompanying notes 200-05.
33 1. See supra text accompanying notes 130-32.
332. Much of the testimony at the hearing held by the Advisory Committee addressed the
selective waiver provision. See HEARING ON PROPOSAL 502, supra note 19, at 35-53, 68, 77.
333. Memorandum from Helane L. Morrison, Dist. Adm'r, S.F. Office of the Sec. Exch. Comm'n,
to the Honorable David F. Levi, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Cal. 1-2 (Dec. 6, 2005)
[hereinafter Morrison Memorandum] (on file with authors) (discussing the SEC's confidentiality
agreements regarding the disclosure of documents during the McKesson investigation).
334. Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation omitted).
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widespread disclosure yet at the same time attempting to prevent use by private

parties. However, substantial limitations on confidentiality in SEC agreements
indicate that government use of protected information after disclosure is likely to
be extensive. Thus, the current practice cuts strongly against requiring
confidentiality agreements as a condition of selective waiver; such confidentiality
agreements do little to protect the privilege.335
The Committee also noted that congressional legislation introduced in 2003
and supported by the SEC did not require a confidentiality agreement to prevent
waiver of the privilege when privileged documents were shared with the SEC. 336 To
the extent the Committee is doing Congress's work in drafting Rule 502, the
Committee considered this proposed legislation to have some relevance.
The Committee also took note of the SEC's examination program,"which
inspects the books and records of brokerage firms, investment advisers and mutual
funds. ' 337 These examinations are not performed pursuant to confidentiality
agreements, yet they rely on cooperation and turnover of privileged
communications and work product. 338 The Committee concluded that if selective
waiver is adopted, it would be as a means to encourage cooperation with
government investigations; if this is so, then the encouragement should apply to all
aspects of government regulation.
Fundamentally, the Committee concluded that a confidentiality agreement
requirement imposed a formalism that would impede efficient cooperation with the
government-a formalism that has very little to do with whether it is fair or
appropriate to limit the breadth of a waiver of privilege or work product. Essentially
the requirement would create additional work for attnorneys without an apparent
corresponding benefit. The reasoning is probably best explained in a paragraph of
the proposed Committee Note:
The Committee considered whether the shield of selective
waiver should be conditioned on obtaining a confidentiality
agreement from the government agency. It rejected that condition
for a number of reasons. If a confidentiality agreement were a
condition to protection, disputes would be likely to arise over
whether a particular agreement was sufficiently air-tight to protect
against a finding of a general waiver, thus destroying the
predictability that is essential to proper administration of the
335. See supra notes 175-99 and accompanying text (discussing In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc.,
Sec. Litig., 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006), cert denied sub nom., Qwest Commc'ns Int'l Inc. v. New
England Health Care Employees Pension Fund, No. 06-343, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 8627 (U.S. Nov. 13,
2006)).
336. Morrison Memorandum, supra note 333, at 2 (discussing Securities Fraud Deterrence and
Investor Restitution Act of 2003, H.R. 2179, 108th Cong. (2003)).
337. Id. at 2-3; see also Mary Ann Gadziala, Assoc. Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Speech on the SEC Examination Program: Coordination
and Priorities (Feb. 7, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch020706mag.htm
(describing the SEC examination program).
338. Id.
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attorney-client privilege and work product immunity. Moreover,
a government agency might need or be required to use the
information for some purpose and then would find it difficult or
impossible to be bound by an air-tight confidentiality agreement,
however drafted. If a confidentiality agreement were nonetheless
required to trigger the protection of selective waiver, the policy of
furthering cooperation with and efficiency in government
investigations would be undermined. Ultimately, the obtaining of
a confidentiality agreement has little to do with the underlying
policy of furthering cooperation with government agencies that
animates the rule.339
The Committee found it sufficient to condition selective waiver on a finding
that the disclosure is limited to persons involved in the investigation.34 °
VIII.

CONCLUSION

We have attempted to set out the justification for Proposed Rule 502 and the
reasons behind its language. The Rule is now out for public comment, and we fully
expect that there will be considerable discussion of both the need for the Rule and
its language. Certainly, the bracketed selective waiver section will be enormously
controversial.
Most litigators report that the burden placed on them and on their clients of
protecting attorney-client privilege and work product protection during the
discovery phase of many civil and white-collar criminal cases has become
overwhelming. Something must be done to reduce the costs of such discovery. We
believe that Proposed Rule 502 will reduce the expense of the process, yet guard
against abuse that may occur with a rule giving carte blanche to turn over privileged
documents without any review of their content. Furthermore, the Proposed Rule
guards against an alternative rule that disregards fairness considerations by
permitting unfettered use of information dealing with the same subject matter as
contained in disclosed documents. The Proposed Rule also gives parties the
opportunity to agree on disclosure arrangements that not only bind the parties to the
agreements but bind others as well. The Rule contemplates an impact not only on
future federal court proceedings but also on state court proceedings. We believe that
such an impact is justified and necessary if the Rule is to have a real effect on costs
to parties, but we expect that public comment will better inform us all as to the
tolerance for such an intrusion on previously accepted notions of comity between
federal and state courts.
The selective waiver provision is intended to promote a more open dialogue
between federal government agencies and individuals or companies investigated by

339. REVISED JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 271, FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory
committee's note (Proposed 2006).
340. Id.
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the agencies. As reflected in the case law, there are good reasons both for
permitting disclosure of information limited solely to the agency and for holding
that any disclosure results in a waiver as to the entire world. Subsection C sets out
a rule that we believe effectively limits the waiver of information disclosed to a
federal government agency. The difficult policy decision is whether such a
provision is justified. Ultimately, the decision of whether to include the selective
waiver section is the kind of public policy decision appropriately left to
Congress.34'
Our position is that Proposed Rule 502, as drafted and submitted for public
comment, deals effectively with the issues involving inadvertent waiver, scope of
waiver, and selective waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product
protection. We hope that this Article has laid the groundwork for a thorough and
meaningful discussion on whether we are right about the effectiveness of our

341. During preparation of this Article, President Bush signed the Financial Services Regulatory
Relief Act of 2006 on October 13, 2006. Section 607 of the Act provides protection against waiver for
privileged material disclosed to a banking agency or credit union. Financial Services Regulatory Relief
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 607, 120 Stat. 1966, 1981 (2006), PL 109-351 (Westlaw). Section
607(a) amends section 18 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828, to provide as follows:
(x) PRIVILEGES NOT AFFECTED BY DISCLOSURE TO BANKING AGENCY OR
SUPERVISOR.(1) IN GENERAL.-The submission by any person of any information to any Federal
banking agency, State bank supervisor, or foreign banking authority for any purpose in the
course of any supervisory or regulatory process of such agency, supervisor, or authority shall
not be construed as waiving, destroying, or otherwise affecting any privilege such person
may claim with respect to such information under Federal or State law as to any person or
entity other than such agency, supervisor, or authority.
Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 § 607(a).
Section 607(b) provides an identical amendment to section 205 of the Federal Credit Union Act,
12 U.S.C. § 1785. Id. § 607(b).
The Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act differs from Proposed Rule 502's provision on
selective waiver in some important respects. Most importantly, the Act provides the protection of
selective waiver to disclosures made to state regulators. In contrast, Proposed Rule 502 states that the
effect of a disclosure to a state regulator is governed by state law. REVISED JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
REPORT, supranote 271, FED. R. EvID. 502(c) (Proposed 2006). Arguably, the Act's coverage of state
disclosures might call for a similar extension in Rule 502-after all, the Committee is essentially
drafting a privilege rule for Congress, and Congress appears willing to extend the protection of selective
waiver to state-based disclosures. However, it could be argued that congressional authority over banking
raises a stronger federal interest than one which might exist with respect to disclosures to other state
regulators. Congress might be interested, and justified, in covering disclosures to state banking
regulators without trying to cover other state-based disclosures. The Advisory Committee must
determine whether the policy animating the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act can properly
extend to protecting disclosures to state regulators across the board.
The major effect of the Act might be the indication that Congress is interested in, and favorably
disposed toward, the protection provided by selective waiver. Congress requested that the Advisory
Committee prepare Proposed Rule 502. It may behoove the Committee to include a selective waiver
provision for Congress's consideration in light of the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act. The
argument would be that the drafters should take account of congressional intent, and therefore Congress
should at least have the option to consider a selective waiver provision that would apply beyond the
banking area.
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drafted language and on the more important issue of whether a rule of this kind is
a good idea.
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